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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Professor Robert S .  
Hartll;lan:' s notion that the individual human person. is of . infinite 
• • • • > • � 
valueo In a recent paper�he attempts to esta�lish his concept by 
arg�en�s which are·founded upon four axiological . definitions of 
�an. : episte'l!lqlogical , l,ogical , ontological , and: teleological. 
The thesis is.conc�rne4 with the.validity of . the argumen�s ,  
t�!eir .applicibility: to tl).e existing human person , and whether or 
not Pro�essor Hartma� has made unwarranted assumptions . 
I. conc+ude-,that·his arguments tend . to be,circular , and:there 
are . too many assump�ions . I:belieye he has ma�e a good case · f�r 
the uniquenees of the,human per�on , but the notion that · man is 
infinite h�s not been suff iciently clarified . 
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CHAPTE� I 
A BRIEF REVIEW OF . ROBERT S .  HARTMAN' S 
SYSTEM OF FORMAL AXIOLOGY 
I� INTRODUCTION 
Robert S .  Hartman�s Formal Axiology,is . a  sc ien�ific system 
designed for the exact · rneasurement of value , resulting in-the same 
mathematical precision - that is now used in the physical sciences . 
Formal axiology is based:on the logical . nature of meaning , 
name�y intension , and on the structure of inten�ion - as a s�t · 
of,predicates� It applies set theory to t�is set·of,pred­
icates . Set theory is a certain kind of mathematics that 
deals with subsets in general , and of finite and-infinite 
sets in partic�lar . Sinci:e rnathematic!il is obj ective and� 
priori ,  formal axiology.is . an obj ective and;� priori science ; 
and a test ba�ed on it is an obj ective - test based on an 
obj ective standa�d . l. 
· 
Since formal a�iology is concerned wi�h the pure form of value , 
the axielogist does not value but ana�yzes value . He must be profes-
sional and expert in value , having mastered ''the fundamental prin-:­
ciples and,general laws that underlie all valuing . "2 The axiom which 
prov:f,.des , the foundation from which formal.axiology , evolves is that 
value is,the degree in which a thing possesses the set of properties 
corresponding to the set·of,predicat�s in . the intension of its concept.3 
1Robert ,S . ·Hartman, "Formal AxiCi)logy and . the Measurement of 
Val1,1e , "  Journfl of Valu� Inquir)'t ! . '(Spring , 1967), p .  39 . 
2Robert �s. ·Hartman, The Structure ot Value (Ca'J;"bondale . and 
Edwardsville: Southern Il+inois University Press, 1967), p • .  7. 
3Robert S •. Hartwan • "The Logic of Value , "  'Xhe Review of Meta­
physics , VoL XIV , No . 3 (March , 1961), p .  389. · 
l 
Mea11ing , the�, is value , i . e . , t�e meaning of a thing becomes 
the measure of�its value . Meaning is-richness of-properties . Ac-
cording to Hartman , t�ere . are·t�ree kinds of sets of attributes , 
depeqding on th.e ·number of attributes ,in ·question: 
• . . •  finite sets, denumerably_infinite set s ,  �nd . non­
denumerably infinite sets . The three kinqs of sets 
determin� - three kinds of :concepts : finite sets are in� 
tensions 9f synthetic\concepts , denumerably infinite-sets 
are inten�ions of-analytic concepts , and non-denumerably 
infinite sets are · intensions . of singular concepts . The 
fulfillments of the t�ree - kinds of c0ncepts give rise to 
three kinds - of value , _systemic, value , extrinsic value , 
intrinsic value . 4 
·· 
Hartman: adds , 
Finite intensional sets measure systemic value , de­
numerably infinite intensional sets ._measure extrinsic. 
value , ·non-denumerably infinite intensional sets measure 
intrinsic.value . 5 
Or , ·to put it another way , there are. three kinds of. concepts: 
constructs ,  absq·act�;�, ·and singular concepts . Correspondingly there 
are three dimensions of value:.syste�ic value as the fulfillment of 
the construct, extrinsic-value as the.fulfillment of the abstract , 
and:intrinsi� value as.the fulfillment of,the singular concept . 
C�nstructs are of finite , abstracts of.denumerably infinite, and 
singular c9ncepts of non-denumerably,infinite content . The dimen� 
sions of :value form a hierarchy of intensional cardinalities n ,  N o ,  
and N 1, ·respec�ively . Systemic valuation· is th� m.odel of schematic 
4rbid . , pp . -389-390. 
5Rart�n; Strugtture of Value , p .  19. 
2 
thinking, extrin�ie valuation�that of pragmatic thinking , intrinsic 
valuation that of emphatic--and empat�ic--thinking.6 
Ilo · TEE·MEASURE OF VALUE 
Ju�t a� ·we have universal: laws . in the physical sciences and . 
in music , Hartman demonstrates the possibility for axiological laws 
which woulQ structure value . Since physical science and music are 
applied mathematics , mathematics is then a more,universal form than 
either the physical sciences or .music . But mathematics is not it-
self-so fundamental , ·or absolute , as rational thought , or logic . 
Just as physical science and music,are applied mathematics , so 
mathem,atj.cs is applied . to logic . 
Thus, on tbe·highest and , abso�ute plane , rational-beings 
can communicate · by means of the system . of logic itself . 
The fundamental relation of.logic--that of class membership 
(Bertrand Russell , The Principles of Mathematics , Cambridge , 
1903 ,·p . 26 )--is the,relat ion of rationality itself : the 
relat:f,on between concepts an� objects . If there�are·beings 
tha� combine concepts · in th�ir m�nds with objects in the 
world the� we have·rat io�al beings . This capaci�y of relat­
ing con�eptual meaning to obj ects is the definition of 
rati�nal+tyo7 
3 
Just as rational beings everywhere can communicate on the basis 
of this fun4amental,relation E.[ rat ionality, so ethics when it· is 
founded · on,this �niversal relation bet�een.concepts . and obj ects , may 
be:unde�sto9d'by , rational . beings everywhere in this · or any other . 
world . 
6Robert S .  Hartman , "formal Axiology and the,Measurement of 
Values , "  p .  44. 
7Robert S o  .Hartman , . "Four Axiological , Proofs of :the Infinite 
Value .of Man, 1 1  Kant.,-Studien , (1964) Vol . LV , No. 4, p .  428 . 
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Formal · aJC;iology , the science of val1,1e , is a form of;ratiqnal�ty 
which enables 1,1s to syste�atically understand that comple� and varied 
part of our lives.. which cannot.be defined by physical science alone. 
It ·is . the art of ,f inding the · correspqndence ., between fact and va��e,. 
a distinction as·ten1,1o1,1s and:straight�orward as it is tre�endous and 
penetrating . - It 
. •  · ,  arrives at :a Copernican inversion of fact · and val�e : 
ratheJ; tha'Q value being a.kind·of fact , fact is a kind of 
value ; ra�her than . val1,1e being the·norm �act ,-fact is the 
�of val-ue ; rather than fact beiJ;lg.real and value unreal, 
val1,1e is real and fact is unreal . Value is the reality of, 
which fac� the .;e;sur-e.s · · · · ·  
The difference between tl�e·sc�ence of natur� and the s�ience 
of valu� is the ·differ�nce.between logical e�tensionality and inten-: 
sionality . "As the science . of nature . details the e�perience .of ·. 
spatio-t�mporal ev.ents ,  so the science· of value details the. meanip.gs 
I 
of these·events!"9 
In- e�tensiona� log;l.c . .  a tbing is -de. scribed in terms of the 
schema within which it - is.an · inliJtance of·the concep t ,  as a partic1,1lar . 
Intensi9nal+y, it is seen in terms of:itself alone�. Thus , the in-
dividual is a continuum in space and time , and has no · definit ion , 
since "def inition" is the isomorphic pattern of attributes .possessed 
by t�e members of a.class . But the individual can be understood only 
by a complete.description or depiction of , itself,10 s ince it is itself 
and.not an abstrac�ion of a set · of,a�tr�butes . 
8Hart�n, Structure of .. Value , p. 220 . 
9Hartman� ·"Four Axiological Proofs , "  p. 429 . 
lORobert S .  Hartman , "Singular and ParticulaJ;" ," Critica 
(Me�ico , :  1968) , Vol. II, p .  16 . 
As _we have · seen , value is measured by , the description or 
enumeration of the . propert ies wh:(.ch a.thing possesses · "cc;�rreeponding 
to th� set.of attributes,in·the int�nsion of its cqncept . "ll Or , ·to 
repeat the key phrase · in formal axiolagy; "Value is meaning." 
When we say that l iJ;e -has meaning we .mean that-it,has 
value .. The ·.richer its meaQ.ing , the richer its value . 
When we say:that . life has na meaning we.mean it-has no 
value" The paorer . its meaning th� paorer its value • .  A 
meaningless lif e _  is a life without ·value.l2 · 
Because of the importance . at understanding his use af measure 
in formal axielogy , 1 am in�luding a rather ex1;ended quotation from 
Professor _ Hart�an on the.subject : . 
A sta�dard ef measuring is.a s�t·ef units , arbitrarily 
selected , which is applicable to ce�tain phenomena and by 
c9mparisen wit� which these phenomena can be'numerically . 
dete�in�d . Thus ,.the standard of length ia the.meter 
composed ef centimeters as .units . We .measure tqe length· 
ef phenemena by seeing either how many.times.  they f it into 
a meter or hew many t imes,a meter fits·into them. Thus , 
if we . coul4 measure value by meaning we . weuld have to use · 
meaning as a.measuring rod which we fit.te a thing and from 
which we . CQuld read off, the number , · as .it were , of the .value 
of the · thing .· It ·SO happens that not only is meaning ai 
measure ("meaning'' a�d "measure" have the. same : etymological 
root� men-,( "mind" , . "tho�ght") ) ,  but value is of such a 
nat\}re� te be fitted precisely to. being measured by it • .  
Obviously , one can,only measure things by a,standard . that. 
is · fit fer them. One(cann9t measure weight by met�rs , or . 
virtue, by second�. ·· In ,which way , then , is meaning a . 
stanqard:of·measurements f itted ·;for value? In .the follew­
ing simple.way , · which is exactly·.analogeus to tt�e · way in 
which a meter is-,a sta�dard of length or a,gram.one of 
weight . 
A meaning is, logically , a - set of words-�of predicates-­
indicat ing the propert ies of something . 
llHartman , "The ,Legic of Value , '' p .  389; 
12Hartman; "Four1Axiological Proofs," p .  429 
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Anything, however, that; is a set can·be .used.as·a measure, 
for a set is something that can be numbered, · "1, 2, 3, . • • "; 
and·a measure is, ·as we have-seen, a device by which number 
can be-.applied to something, counting off the units of .the 
stand<:trd. • 
·
• ·• T�e units of a mea.ning are. t�e predicates 
con�ained in it; and they are counted.off .one·by one. A full 
or ''.real" chair is mea13ured by a fulLmeaning and is one· that 
has all the,properties contained.in the meaning of the word. 
"chair'' just as a length. of a full meter, is one that has all 
100 centimeter�. (�e centimeter had by the length-is 
differen� from that in the meter; and.the property had by the· 
chair is different from the. predicate·in the concept. The 
latter.is th� name of tbe·property). Such·a "full" or "real" 
ch,air,is what we·.call:a "good" c�air. Thus, a thing is.goqd 
if it fulfills its meaning, that is to say, corresponds to 
the full measure-of it� value. If it does.not� it is not­
quite so good, ·or bad;.as a chair.that lacks a seat or a back 
or both .. The words "good,'' "bad, •: etc�, . thus are terms of . 
measuring meaning, logically no different from the words 
"meter," "pound," "hour,·� "dozen," "degree," which measure · 
length, weight, time, amount, intensity, respectively.13 
Hartman. concludes then that value theory(is.at-least as log-
ical as logic ·it�elf or mathematics. In fact, when meaning is the 
standard of value it is a c�iterion more universal than the meter, 
or pound,.or .hour; or any other physical measure, including number 
itself • 
. . • For number is base;d ·.on our 10 digits .aQ.d the meter 
on-the circu111ference.of the.planet Earth, .and: both woulQ. 
have to b.e explained with great care to the .Martians--whose 
system of number may be.based on a much more general, ·indeed, 
a un�versal sett such as the-number of particles in the· 
universe, and whose standard of.length may·be-.equally 
universal, taken -perhaps from the·, radil.ls of _the universe, 
or at,least of the·solar system. But the stanclard:of·value 
wi,ll appear quite natura.! to the Martian, for he-will be 
using exactly th� same standard; th� mea�ing of a thing to 
measure its·,value. · He will call "good" a thing that· fulfills 
itS meaniljlg--the intension -,af itS COn(:ept�-and · 11bad II One thajt' 
does·not. · And it makes.no difference-what· kinds of things 
there are. when the Martian says, "przik has got it all" we 
know he means-przik is good-"rit's got:all it's got.to have, 
And when-he says that-eaGh MartiaQ. tries to:be good, we know 
13 Ibid., .429-430. 
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exacny .what he means. that each. Martian:. trie�. to be all. 
he can possibly be, to develop. him& elf·: to·. the full, . to 
live:up to· his own measure-of ht,ms'elf • .; Iudeed; since. 
ethi�al measure· is more universal .. thaiJ. physical measure, 
we may well be ,able·tQ coJ:!liilunicate .. with.the.Martian 
ethically before 'We .can c9�'nicate with him· in-, terms 
of physics. The-development of the·new.science .ot formal. 
axiology:may therefore be·a precondition to cos�ic 
comm.u�ication, as it may. be.a preconditton to cosmic 
surviva1.�4 · 
In,.summary, Professor Hartman,advances,from G .  E. Moore's 
posit:l,on tbat "good'.' is not it�elf. a descriptive property, though 
it is d�pen4ent upon the existence.of descriptive properties as a 
necessary cqndition. Whea Hartman-, demonstrates .that goodness is 
"concept fulfill,ment," a�d gives this idea a.logically structured 
statement� he brings into focus a science which had been latent in 
pM,.losqphy _.all along. 
14Har�man, "Four Axielogical ·Proofs," ·p. -430� . 
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CHAPTER II 
THE INFI�ITE VALUE OF THE HUMAN PERSON 
I. GENERAL 
Having loake.d at r Professor Hartman;' s ·formal. axiology. in a 
general survey� we n�w focus on his elaborat�on ot value measurement 
as i� is ,applied to man-. in four axiological proofs of the infinite 
value of tbe·human person. The proofs will be labeled,epistemolog-, 
!cal,. lagical, ontological, and. teleological, based on :four well-: 
known ·definit�ons of "man.'.' 
The·. relationship. between value and individuality is .a relat:f,on-, 
ship of intensional logic. Hartman-believes that the individual 
human,person.must be valued ·intrin�ically if he is to be valued 
adequately .  
As we have·seen, within the·,system, there,are·three,distinct, 
but r�lated ·kinds of val�e - systemic, extrinsic, and int�insic -
aild · th�se h�ve corresponding value terms re�pectively: '!perfectien," 
"goedness, 11 and "uniqueness." Systemic· value is the fulfillment of 
the men�al construct-of · a  systemic, .or .logical, ·thing, .such.as a 
geometric :.circle· or. triangle� All. systemic., things have· the value -of, 
perfecticm; they m�..J,st have al,l the properties ef their concepts,- a. 
finit.e and definite_ number of properties, for tl)ey come into being 
by-de�init�on. If the concept is not-fulfilled by the,object, then 
it is n�t merely.imper_fect; itjust-.is not that thing. A circle, 
for example, ·must ·haye ·all the ·,properties of "circle," i.e., a plane. 
8 
cl<!>sed :figure· bo\,lnded by a ·. curved liQ.e · everywhere (equidistant from 
tqe·center, or o�herwise . .it·is nc;>t a1circle� There are no faulty 
circl�s. T�erefore, to value .something systemically is to value it, 
as an:element of a·system� Hep9e systemic·valuation i$ inadeq\,late 
for valuing the.singular:f,ty o� the,indiyidual·hl,Jman person.· 
Extrinsic valuat;ion.values ·a thing not as an element of,a 
system but as,a member of a cl�ss • .  It .is the value of ·an empirical 
thii).g ac�ording to its fulfill�ent:-of ·an analytic,conc�pt. · Where 
we arrive at the systemic concept by a mental-construction; we find 
the. intension of an analyti� concept for e�trii).sic :.valuation by 
abstr�cti(i)n of-the common properties of a group of things. By 
abstra�tiop, we _get a-clasa definition.: But things val\,led e�tri�-
sically have more properties than just the definitional ones--other- · 
wise the abstraction is not an abstr�ction. So, in extrinsic val� 
uation we add.expositional1predtcat�s to. the definitional predicates. 
For example� in order for a,thing to b� a horse i� must meet certain. 
min�al·d�scripti�e properties. For valuation, ·we add expositional 
properties whiqh wi�l define-hqrseyness. S�ch abstr�ctions can·be, 
9 
carri�d on ad in,finitum.. "The intension ··Of the analytic concept con-· 
sists of a ·deJ.wmer_ably infipit�--and · inqefinite-.-number of attrib� 
utes. n15 Copsequently, in ,contrast :.to the intension of the synthetic, 
or logic�!; cqncept · with its fin:f;te n�mber of attriqutes., wh�ch is 
charact�rized by:the number.!!_, the intensional·sttjuCtl:Jre o� the 
analytic ,ccmc�pt is charact�rized by, the transfinite number � 0.16. 
15!Jar�lilan, "The Logic -of _Value," p. 393 • 
16rbid. 
-
10 
Unlike systemic things, -an ,empirical thing does,not have to have all, 
the attributes. of its col).cept in order ,_to ·be, a member of the , class 
designa�ed by tha� concept. Professor John·W. Davis, in disc�sSil).g 
this no�ion, gives .. th� following ex;ample: 
A harse� . • .  may be.a horse and not have.all the · 
properties of the con�ept c11horse. II It co�ld be a 
kn�ck ... kneec;l_,. ·on�-eyed, manel�ss h9rse, fit neither 
far· the plow nor. th,e l{entuC!kY Derby!· and still; be a . harse--a.hors�, but not:a good orie, 7 
We de nQt va�ue with all of .the predicates belonging to the 
analytic concept ·of .a thing, but th� more of them we know, ·the more 
penetra t;:ing will. we· be :.able· to value • .  
Intrinsic value differs from the other two,types of value_in that· 
here we are considering the thing as unique, i.e. its intension is the 
singular. concept .(or better, "unicept"). Its extension is the indi-
vidual.· In this· usage, a singular concept is not a, conc�pt in the·. 
usual_ sense• Instead of�being a-mental entity which brings together 
the_coiD!Ilon·features of a group of·individual·things, it is rather 
"a 'unicept', and experiential ·entity representing one thing in ·its 
uniquen�ss.';'18 The "concept" tl:len and·the thi17-g are one,and the same• 
:Profefilsor.HartJP.B.n q\lotes Edmu�d Husser! on,this.point: "'Qbject it'": 
\ 
self' is nothing but tl:)e idea of ;t.he object's completely fulfilled· 
sense, of it.s co�ple�ely.fulfilled meaij.ing" ("1Sachverhalt salbst' 
•• 
ist -nichts· _anderes ale· di� Idee des, Voll)fommen · erfull;en Sachverhalts-. .. ' . . . f • . . • 
17 John iw• Dav;s, "�s There .a Logic .for Ethics?'�, · The Southern 
.rournal ef PhilosophY;. VoL IV, No. 1, (Spring, 1966), p; 4. I . . . - . - ' 
18Rob_ett,.s. Hartman,·"Value·Theory·as a Formal Syst�,"· �-. 
Studien, Vol. ,L, · (1958-59), p • .  300. 
11 
a ,fusion net; only �?f- "cenc�pt"-and· thing ;but of the-:..thing_ and. the 
agent, and :the extent; to which the experience forms ·one unint:erruptep-
whole or Gestalt, is the extent te whic.h the thing fulfills the 
intension ef its-sil(lgular·cencept� · "The -'predicate� • . . of -the 
intension ce�respond ,exactly tq 1;he-; 'properties';,. • •  of the .individ­
ual. n20 
H;artman wants us to see then that the intension of _the singular 
differs· from the synthetic ·and the ,analytic ,in th�.t th� individual is 
a ne11-denumerable.� rather than _a den\}merable, infinity. 
Hartman argues that neither the systemic valuation, nor the 
analytic concept -.sf extrins:f,c va1uatien could adequately account fer 
the_full-,valuation of tQ.e ·individual, for a finite set; or a·denumet;'- · 
able infinite ·set, "cc;>Uld ne_t "cerreepond" to a nondenumerably infinite 
coptinuum, If this were possi"le, then the con tint,mm woul� not. be 
noo-denumerably infinite. Therefore, Hart�an believes it is necessary, 
to have an intensiena_l·lc;>gic, which he bases upon-;tranafinite math- · 
ematics., 
Inten�ional lQgic ia a cQmprehensive·legical notioQ. of m.eanii).g · 
which incl1,1des all stages:ef meaning, from divining to.the full 
e:l!;perience of m.eanin� in,e:x:istence. "Value ,is 'meaning in its va�ious 
ferma, ·of -f�lfillment. ••21 Hartman-points. out that 
2�:J.chard- C � Legget1;, "Essay op Vahle-and Individuality,'' 
(unpl;lblished paper, Un�versity sf-Tennessee, .Knoxville, n. d. }, · 
p. -4. ' 
21IHacussed in det�il in Rebert S ._ Hartman: s · "Fc;>rmal 
Axio_legy and. Measurement of Vaiue ,-'  ; op. cit • 
• • •  the relationship between systemic,,extrinsic and· 
int;rinE!ic �alue corr�apc:mds t� a .process .. of·.cQ�tinqous " 
enrichment with definite l�aps. from one value ,_dimension 
to the next. TQ.us,, if ·I buy -a package ·of .. cigarettes from · 
a �:�aleslady:_I am in a legal, a.systemic.relationship with 
her. If I ,take.her out'fer dinner Lam in-an-extrinsic 
relat:lens�ip, _and i{ I ta�e her to church and. marry her 
I am il;l, an iut;rillsic ,_relat:l,o:pship w:J,th her: my total b�ing 
is jo�ned.with.hers in·a common intrinsic,Gestalt. This 
Gestalt; grew thrqugh-. successive enJ::I,chment:s, out of t4e 
first t�nuous bot).d; the er:tginal sales c0ntract,22. 
·Hartman adds:· 
Al� intrinsic-relatiQllShips, except those.o� the,family, 
grow 04t 'of .systemicl"and/0r extrinsic ::relations thro1,1gh-. 
pr0cesses Qf eurichmen�; a:pq sucl;l processes Qf .. enrichment 
are as ccimmon as is intrinsic value itsel£,23. l . ' ' 
The point. is ·that we .must·, value individu.als intrinsically, ·· 
becaus� intr;insic valqation is the -�richest it! properties and· there- . 
fore,the best kind· of valuation. To. ':"alue human persons'with any-
thing less would-be a disva�uation. 1 That is,· we woutd be .. impoeing 
a restrict;ion _on the person's indi:vid14ality,·and:this cannot-be . . 
because-we understanq. the.human. person to be an infinity of necess-
12 
it:t,es, poss;f.bil:l,ties; and· actuali.tie�:�. "Man is. essentially infini1:e-� 
� spi.rit�al Gestalt whose card:i,nal:i,�y is -that· of -the cont:f.nuum.1'24 
Professor Hartman's conclusiolls'regarding the valqe of. quman 
persons are ,_beautiful� and we· want very much to believe �them. The· 
problem is whether.or not he has bee:p·successful in supporting his 
conclusions, and. whether or n6t:his arguments.cari be applied to·act;ua!,. 
concrete persons. 
221lart111an, The ,Structure;: of Value, pp. �223-n4. · 
23Ibi:d •• ,. · p. 224. 
24Ib:td., .Po 118 o 
In the_ firs1: ·pl�ce,, tqere seems ··to .be· an �incon_sist;ency in 
Hartman IS· USe Of th� �term 11manl' :l,.n t�e title Of thia article • 25 
This mi_suse c;>f tl;le term is particularly · .striking _when we· note 'his 
emphasis elsewhere on1-the distinction between the,singular and the· 
analyt�c·concepta26 Although he did justify the use of the class 
name.fgr sqme referellces to individua+E!, his excell�nt distiQ.ction· 
would seem ta d�and· a-�ore,prec�se use of the term fqr·this paper. 
"Man'' is a __ gene1;al n.!Wle, rand· the "Fo11r Ax�olo_gic�l 'Proofs',' article .. 
is cl�arly concerned with provillg the.infinite value of the individ-
ual quman· person, not. with the concept ·"man'\ "Man'' does not exist 
except a� a concept in the ·mi'Qd; only the ·ind,ivid:ual, person exi�ts •: 
13 
"Man"· is an· abstrac;,tion, an .analytic concept, and an arial.,ytic conce�t .. 
is never singular,-s�nee it requires that th.re must be at least .. two 
classmemli>ers�27 
While in one sen�e ·it is lesiti�ate to ·refer to. the �individual 
as _a schema,· it is �conftJ..sing to use. the term "man" in the ti�le ,of· 
th� ''Fc;>ur 'Ax�ological Proef s. " Hartman 1 notes the, inconsistency of 
this usage �.elsewhere: .. 
The que�tion . · • o is; what is. the class of men. Is it 
legitil:nat� 1:o e�tend the1exten�ion ef "man," that is, �he 
sch�, 'to'_the whole�.ef ·the persons ,in qu�sti(i)n; which is 
denotecl by the proper :.names, ·an4 say, as some l(i)gicians .do, 
th,at· th.e ·class e� menr·ie the clasa ·ef .Socrates ·,and of Plato. 
an4 of Aristotle� Qbv�ously ·not • ; • • .But how the. referenta 
25Hart111$n, "Fpur ,Axiol.ogi�al· Prcofs_," p. 428 � 
�6Ea.pec�ally in hi� art:icl�., "S�ngu-1.-ar and · Partic�lar, '' · q. v. · 
27 
. 
This. poi11� is di_aeu�sed .-in· detail. in "Singular and· Particl.llar • .  " · 
of these PI'o:Per names ca� be made· the ·re�erents a� the .. 
general name "man", that;: precisely· is. au,t question • , • • . 
th� praper name "Socr�tes'-' refers tQ �he�individual and 
the ,gerteral name "man": refers to the schema "a man••28 
As has been noted earlier in.this·paper, if we are to ade-
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quately val:u,e t'Q.e ind,ividu,al-.persan�- we must value him intrinsically.� 
Ha-rtman argues·. that .. since_ the ;indiyidual person .is · "e�sentiSlly · 
in�inite--a spiritual·Gestalt whose'cardinality is that af �he. 
carttinuumll "2� he ought, to be yalued intrinsically (I I), but when we 
subsu,me ·.him un.der , a class ·name· we ,value him extrinsically (I�)- -and · . . ' ; 
thqs inadequate:J;y �--
Au empirical· th;tng detei'D).ined by an analytic concept -.is · 
always.a particular thing, a member of ·a cla:ss'of at .least 
t;wo ,. and .. never a singular thing. The valueS� connected ·with 
singuh.r things are· again. different fram those ·connected 
with p�rticular things, due ta. the;different axiqmetric 
structure-. of the singuiar intension. If systemic va-lqe ·is 
the value _.of ·Perfection -and ex.trinsic ;value that of GoQdness, · 
singular ar�intrinsic yalue is.the value ,of Uniqueness.30 · 
A sec;:�;md,.problem related to .Hartl)lan's general-,approach ta the 
valuati�n·of -the human,persan is what-precisely are.we valuing?· The· 
act�al persan? The-potential person� Or, are we val�.�:ing a tra�s..:. 
c�dental,nan-spatia-t�:rnparal self?_ There is same question as �a 
whether Professor Ha,rtman- is, settled :Ln his _own mind on t;hil;l point. 
FQr example, in ,an·eai'lier writing he discusses the ep:Lste�Qlagical 
pro()f'w:hich argues: 
As:there are�Qf0 actions,af·thaught capable7of being 
thaught 'in.,. r'J 0 levelS of tht;)ught, each of tqese theugl].ts ·. 
28ijartman). "Singular and Particu�ar ,, " pp. 13-l-4 � 
29Har��n; 'l'he·Strugture of Value, p. 118• 
30rb.ido1 p. 195. 
and levels combinable with a�l the others i� anytpermuta�ton 
possible, man'e rationality, in this interpretatio�, ·is of­
cardinality z:x:o = \1.� v which. means that the, characterist:f:.c · 
number _of ma� defined as rational being is ('.( 1• Obviously, no individual can actually think all these thoughts·. · The 
demonstration of man's infi�ity refers to ideal man; j� 
as no actual line can ever be of one. dimension, as' the 
definition of "line'.' demands, and ·'JS no reaLsphere can,ever 
touch a plane in only one,point. 31 
', 
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It· is clear in this statement .. that· Profe·ssor Hartman's notion 
of the infinity of tq.e human person refers to something like a "Pure 
form of man,'' a kind. of ·Platonic ideal which does, not actually exist 
concretely, a�y·more than does the ideal line -exist concretely, or 
the ideal sphere. If it is only the,ideal person which Hartman 
wants to define as being infinite, ,then the four axiological proofs. 
of the infinite value of man have no relation to actual existing 
persons. But this conc+usion would seem to be contrary to what 
Professor Har:tman wants to.say about,existing human persons. 
In his reply to a question on this problem Hartman states: 
A thing has the value which is determined by the.cardinality 
o� the number of predicates in the intension.of its concept. 
The person in.the "Four Axiological Proofs" is defined by 
various-intensions; and it is the person thus defined which is 
of infinite value. I don't think: that anyWhere I use· the 
notion of Pure Ego, either in that article or in The Structure 
of Val4e. I might use the notion of t�anscendental self, and 
I would identify this with tbe·person.as fa� as value is· 
concerned. Thus, I speak of the,person that' fulfills the 
definitions(given in the various proofs. What is of infinite 
value, ·then, is the,person as fulfilling the intension by 
which it is defined;, e.g. in the epistemological proof, the 
definit.ion "Man is a ratio�al being. " Anything that is,a 
rational being is:according to tbis proof, of infinite value. 
31Hartman, · "The Logic of Value," p. 410. Italics mine 
And· it says. there, as also, ·e. g. , . in The, Structure. of Va).ue 
p. 118, "that: every indiv:(;dual per�on is as infinite as the 
wqole spac_e-time u�iverse. •,•32 
When we join together the-above quotation, it is still not 
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cl-ear what Professor Hartmanrrefers to when._he speaks.of "the ·infinite-
value <:lf. theihuman·person". At one·point he say�;� "the demonstration 
of man's infinity_ refe.rs tQ !,deal man. u33 At another time·he says, 
"Anythi"Qg ·that is a rational being is:· • • 0� infinite vah,te 
And • • • every individual. person is·. as · infinite as _.the whole, space- · 
time univer�e. -"34 A ratiol).al being, accc;>rding to _Hartman, . "is one 
who has the capacity of combining concepts with objects • • •  which 
is really the capacity _af. finding one �s way in tl).e world by represent-
ing it_.ta hitllself, tha,t is, by naming material objects and inter­
rela-ting the-; names in quest ian. n35 Surely ac t�al concrete persons 
cauld q�alify··hex:e; If thii!J is what �rtman·means by "person',�, then 
there are· existing beings_. which are of ·infinite value. But if 
infinity ref�rs aQly to. the .. ideal man, then no such creature exists 
for no actual. canc�ete person can actually think ·ill the thoughts 11! 0 
required .in the definitiono .. 
32Rabe�t s. Hartman, lett_er to. Raym�nd ,M. 'Pruitt, _ dated · 
July 16, 1971 
mine.·· 
�3Ha,rt�n; "The Logic,af·Value," p. 410. 
34Hartwa� � ''Faur ·Axiological Proofs," p •. 431. Italics 
35Ib:J.d. 
It .might. be possi�le to underst�nd .what Harttnan · mea,.ns by the , 
infinity .. of· the ind:l,vidu�l person, if we think of the ;person ·in. 
t�rms ef a�l·his. possibi.l,.iti�s, were he not-extrinsically l,imit:ed: 
by· sh�rtness o� life and; et:her extrinsic hu�n· fraU. tie�. · There 
is no point _in eit�er of the four proofs at whi�� we· can say· 
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logically tl)at the ·individual: coulQ. not: (1) , have . one more thought •· 
(�) ·make · one more. sel�-reflection, (3) add one 'more' property to hiS 
e�istence,_ (4) or have one more moment of. self-realization. So, 
acco�ding to i�ten�_ional·logic, _the individual person,. if :he is to 
be· a person, ·must ·have the. logical, potential po�sibility of ful-
filling -t�e definitioQ. given •in- the four p�oofs. 
' ' 
But despite-the friendlin�ss of thi� appr9acl;l to H�rtman's-
syst�m, he. see�s · to. have :hea:ded ·it coff at the . _pass, by pr�hibiting 
thei intrinsi<;: yaluatic;m of ;the empirical, or cc;mcrete self. 
Onl:y. the empirical "self is spat:io-temp9ra+. But intrinsic:· 
ethics has nothing to do wi;h tl).e emp':l,rical self nqr do�s-it. 
apply the;categories of�caus� and-effect. In Kant., ethics is· 
bas�d o� the ,noti�n ·-of, freeqgm �- cau,se and effect, on the 
autonqmous, sel�-determination of the,person; ai)d the sam� is 
the case in .formal·· axi9logy; • • � In ,other words, the ethics . 
which appears .. when· we define. it as the application of . intrin­
sic :va�ue c;>f. the. individual person ;.is· existential ethics, . the 
relat:l,an of the person ·to. himself,. in self-re.flection. 3 6  
When ·. Hart�n says that formal s.xiology, as ,in -Kant; h based · 
on�the no�ien of f:reedalll·fr�,?Pl cause and·effect, on tl;le·autonomotis. 
self�det�;rminati.0n of ·t1)e person, ·he ,still speaks of the.,Self ("the 
traQ.sCe1;l.dental unity !)f. apperception,"·. f9r I<ant). as ·a ca.usal age1,1t 
thJ;ougQ. sel�-determinatian. , I think .. Kant:· was wrong' in: .suppqsin� that 
3�Har�1'ilalh ·le�ter .of Pruitt. Ital;f,cs mine. 
when we are.determin�� by.reasan we-are·not determined at all. - And 
while Professor Hartman denies t�at cause and .. effect can be applied 
to the self-qetermination of the pe�son� he may·be raising more 
questions t�an· _he ·is answering in the ·process. It ,is at . this point 
that he presents difficulties which cannot be1ignored. 
Professor Edwards,has pu(:· soJ11e'of -these difficulties in 
relief: 
No matter wha,t the word "value" may ultimately t:url) otit 
to mean,- I .do not think that we _human beings are able · to 
value anyt:�ing �nl�ss t�at thing can affect us in so�e way. 
And_· it· is only. the kind o� sel� which can function as a 
cause .  that can ,have ;mgral duties. A cauee-lcass self could 
never: do-., anythiq.g, and · if we accept .. the "cannGt · implies 
GUgbt; ·.not" principle, _then it could n�ver, have. any �oral 
dutie.� tG do anything. In what. then coul,.d moral duty cqn..:.. 
sist?,. (An4 if we define �aral responsibility in. terms of 
being . the originative ·cause of �nie �s ··actiGns., then such a 
non-c�l.\8al. sel� cGul,.d never be sai4 to be responsible · for 
anything).47 
We a,re left .. with. the very fundamental ·qu�stion ·as to whether 
Hart�anr �; transcenden.tal. approach, to valuation is really applicable 
to h�man persons at all� Hartman, of course, admits that 
There is also a-kind of ethics.which deals with the 
progress of tb� person-in space and·time, namely teleo­
lqgical ethics� but_this belongs to extrinsic'rather· 
tqan.:i.ntrinsic value and is �ore psychology (extrinsic 
value _applied to the .  individual ·pet: son) 38 than ethics in 
the intrin�ical.ly defin�d-sense. _ • • · •  T�us the intrin�ic 
aspect: Gf psychology overlap� wit}:l ethics ae.intrinsic· 
value.applied to individual·persons. There· are·very subtle 
distincq.ons,here, as far exampl,.e in- the telealogy of 
Nicslai Hartmann . in what he -.call� the ,backward .determination 
37 Rem B. Ed:wards, "Some.Spuri0us Proofs· for the 'Pure Ego'," 
unpublished paper, University of,Tenneesee, ·Knoxville, . (n.d.), 
PP.• -1� 2. 
38The Hartmanian sym_'Qol for this valuation iEJ IE. 
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from the future to �he -�present of the :·three..-fald ' final- . 
istic nexus ' where intrinsic . time .determin.ations · take · 
place • .  But th�se .d:i.sti�cti�ns depend an , the disti�ctian 
between intrinsic time - and extrinsic time and is not 
di�cussed in any . af . my publ!shed writings. 39 . 
When the valua�ian . of the hu�n pe:rson : is· ba�ed upon a , tran­
cenqental ·ba��s i� the ,Kant�an s�nse, it is dou��ful whether we can 
spe�a:k of · ."persan" , or "self'' a� all, .  It .is the nature of- t:ranscei1d-
en,tal , lagic to be cancern�d with - the content of ·knowledge only in 
19 
so far as- that . content is form. In othet;' weirds�  transcendental know-· 
ledge is 1Ileta-knowledge• -knowledge about · haw knowledge·is had, and 
the supre:pte principle · of ,. this· meta-:-knowledge · is the unity of ap-
per':!eption :  , "The · _synthetical un�ty ._of apperception is, therefore ' 
the highest point with which all · employtnent .,of ·the understand in�, 
and eve.n the whole of .logic, and, aft�rwards the ·whole of transcend-
ental , philosop�y ; must be cont:1ected; ay, . that fac;ulty is the under- ­
st;anq:l,ng itse],.f. "40 
In .saying th�t the faculty .af apperception is· actually the 
understanciing itself, �ant · is giving the ·farmal, element of experience, . 
i . e  • .  th,ose canditions which any object must 1 meet ,in order to became 
an 9bj ect of knowledge o We cannot say ;  however, that apperception 
is a self; �t :f,s just a , universal epistemqlogical princ;iple. We 
cannG>t; say �hat Kant pes its a persanal ·, self which performs . a synthe; 
siz�ng ac.t; �-
3�Har�'Q18n1 ,_letter to · Pruitt 
40IDlJI18n'Qel -. Kant, CriUque af P1,1re Reason, translated ; by 
F . .  Max Mul.ler, Anc;hor Book�, Doubleday & Company , . Garden · City, 
New Yat;'k;  19 6 6, . p. �7� •. 
but on�y·that s�lf...;.consciousQ.eSE:I . nec�ssarily ar.ises 
out 1 of the syntheti� processes . gene-rative . of . experiences . 
and - can tqerefore ,be postull!lted _ as : a . condition without 
which de facto experience - could not ' be , possible � 41 
Even if we could .. say tl:lat transcendental,. philosopl)y refers 
the synthetic . activiti�s wh�ch produce exp�rience, ()r we could · say, 
out of the en�ounter of the .faculty of apperception with the - world 
as· appearanceo · 
Kem,p Smith el,aborate� ori - tllis aspect of the proble�,: 
Menta+ processes�- in so far as-. they are generative of 
experience, must fa�l · out_side the -�field of C<?nci<?usness, .  
and as. activities dynamically creatiye cannot - be of the · 
natur� of i<;i.eae _or · cotltent;s.  They are not: subconscious 
ideas bu � non-conecious · processes·. They are· nqt · the 
submerged content:. �f e�perience but ·.its conditioning 
groun<;is. Their most . significant chiJ.rac;teristi<:: has still,., 
however., ·to _ be · mentiot:led. They must·� no longer be inter­
preted in .subjectivist .. _terms, as originating in. the .. separate .. 
existence of an individqal self . In condit:f,.oning· experience . 
t11ey generate . the only self fo.r which. experience ' can . vouc}:l, and consequently, in ,tl'\e absence·. of .. full . and . independent 
pr�of P .  must ·. p.ot be con�eiyed as . .'individually circul!lscribed. 
The prol:>lel!l of knowledge, properly :.conceived, ·is no loi),ger . 
how c�n�ciousness ,. iridividu�lly conditioned • can ( lead us 
beyond , its· own bol,lnds, but ·. what· a con�iousness, which is at 
once cqncie:usness o:; obj ec t:s , and also 
4�
�ncieusness o� a ·. 
seH ,  must imply · for its possibility. . 
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Professor Hartman! seems to w�ver between a Kantian and · a  Kierke-
gaardian notion of the sel�. The· former seems more. difficult to rec-
oncile wit� the ; Hartman- system than the ; latter. · T}:lis latter concept 
will be consid�red . in • ;the discussion of the , epistemological proof P 
41 Richard C ;  Legge�t, A Critical , Analysis.of ·Jonathan Bennett ' s  
Treatment of- Kant ' s  Notion of Synthesis, Unpublished'master � s · th�sis, 
University uf� T�nnessee, ·Kn�x\rille, ·.1968 ; p; 57 . 
· 
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. 
Kemp .Smith, ·A Gommentar;x. to K§nt ' s  ' Critique ·of . Pure Reason ' ,  
The Macmillan Company, New · York� · 1950, PP ·· 27 ':r-274 . - · · · · 
Il o T�E �PISTEMOLQGICAL PRQOF 
The episte111:ological proo.f ' has its _ ground in r, the definition 
9f man as. a rat:i,.-9nal being.  "RI!'ti�nalll mean�ng for H�rtman the 
cap.;tcity of combi:r;dng _concepts- with obj e�ts1 ,which is really the 
capac;Jty __ of . finding one�s way in the world by representing it to, 
himsel£ � "4� - According t:o this definition , in order for a man to 
be ._a man, he must be abl� to "�ombine concepts with obj ects: "44 
and thi$ thet:t becomes the in.tensian . of · the individual human . person, 
for he is .able · to car:rEdate· t!1augl)t with ·things. If we call each 
conc;ept .a t:ho4ght; �-. t:he ,intension 9f tl:l,e individ�al , humal). person nqw 
become� "thinking ·th�4ghts. � ��� Pro.fes�c:n:· Hartman · notes : , 
In. order for this intension tQ be .;1 meas�re, .we must 
spell aut: the set :·it col).sists of . . l'his is the set. of 
"thaughts", me�ni:ng the l thought items a .man,.must ·.be able 
to .think :l.n arder ta . be ( a  man • .  Fully elabor�ted, the 
intension of man is: . "thinking tha1,1ght .!! aQ.d . thinking 
tho.u.ght !.. at).d · thinking thought u and • • • etc n '' Since 
each thought ' is .  the name · of a thing, the number of 
th-oughts a .man m\lst be abl.� t:o think in · arder to. be a ·  
man must correspond to t}J.e ·n�mqer af things • .  According 
te . a  t;heQrem of • transfinite mathemat;ics, _ ariy : ct:?llection 
of .'mattarial oqj·ects is at most denumerably -infinite, 
that is t: o  say ,- can ' be p\lt, , at most into . one-to-one 
corre�pondel).ce with the series af · rat;:l,cmal· numbers. The · 
cardinality _a£ , thia serj,es is A0 • We are using "A" for 
the Canto,rial). "aleph" . • • • . Hence, th� n\llllb�r of 
t;ha\,lghts� in ,the sense) defined, that·, a nian1 muet,be  able 
to think, is at most ' del)umerably :f.nfillite, or Aa �  This 
d�_es nof ch�nge . _if we . add ,  .ta th'- names . of :tl�ings, the · 
names of ac ty,al s4ch . sets--:-of si,t;uat;ions--must again be 
4�Har.tma'I\Q : "Fo.�r All:icHogical · Proof s,"  · p. · 43.1 . 
44rbtd .-----
45Jb:f.d o 
definite and hence den1,1merahle ;  and · the . sets ' of _ logical 
s\,lcli .sets--:-of classes..;.-must � be definite and . hence · de­
numerabl,e (even though, · under . anQther .viewpoint , .. it . 
mus1: be ·;regarded ; as · no�-denumerable) . 46 · · 
l,Jp t�. t;hie point in ·. the epistemological ·  argument , the 
intension c;J( man., is · a denumerably infinite set of predicates , and 
accq>rdil'!-gly � man . _is · a denumerable inf inity ; the cardinl;llity of his 
val�e as sucJ;l is A0 • · The number of iteD1s ·in . the intendon . of · a  
concept is called · the characteristic number of the corresponding 
) 
thing , a : .term coined by . Leibniz precieely .. for the purpose of sig­
nifying ·the_ cardinality .. of . an .  inten.sio� . 47 However , .the def inition 
of "�Pan" : involved mo:te , :than ·,. this def inition inc;licates . These ' ----
thought · items �� . .!_,� u ,  etc; . , must also be tho\lght . both extensionally 
and int;eneiona�ly . 
Extensionally understood , the - set in question becomes 
what Dedekind _called meine Gedankenwelt , .my ·world of 
thoughts 1  , the set - of ipossible _ obj ects of; thought . of a 
thinker . · • • • Each · of · the A0 items may be thought , 
that is , it may be thot1ght that they are being thought : 
and it may be .tho'\Jght that; . the . latter . thoughts are 
being . thought; , and so on ad infinitum . · Each thought can 
be thought as thought Ao times : t;he , itam .� can be thought ' 
as • thought , and the · thought that � is thought , � 1 · 
may be the\lght . as being thought � and so on ' to .. A0 "primes" • 
Si il 1 . t t f I I I I I I t i l l  . • U U I U" . U I II U I 1 1 1 1  D1 ar y -�- _ , t , t , t • · · , .:::..L _ , _ , _ , _ • 
Since . the�e are Ao thought-;-items t'Qus capable of being 
thought , each such thought . combinable with every other , 
the ·, t�tal of my Gedankenweit is 2 ·Ao "' A1 • .  The character-: 
istic . number of "tru:�.nir is then A1 . · Man , as a ratienal, being , 
is an infinity . _of cardina.lity .i\1 , . a  thought continuum, a 
spiritual .-Gestalt . �a · 
47 ·, Ibid . , p .  432 .  
� 
- ·· ·  
46Ibitl ; 
-.....-. 
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Continuing., · Profeaaor H�rt111an · wri�es :. 
Intensic;�nally · understood ,. the � think:lng � of ·each .: of ·, the 
"No (A�) .  tqought items �f · the . orig:lnal . set �gives ·rise . to 
tqe same ·cardinalit:y . · "'l'4inking'' h�re means . not -�nly · .  
tqink;Lng �' but ·. tqinking �·: Each . qf th.e ·items :l.s 
not :·only : a name den<ilting a ·materii:ll,. - object ,but . also . a  -. 
concept co,:1not;:in� - it ;  �nd :eac,h .: concept .has <its own .. inten.,.. . 
sion - cons:l,sting of . tqe pr�dicates signifyipg the ,properties : 
of the t.hi"Qg , or things , ·in question . . If t;:h�ee :things - are 
at least ' two , these proper.tiee must . be .common t;:b , . abstracted · 
from, . the things as ·metllbers of . the · class: �n questi�n . The 
larger . tqe number of class members , , the smaller the number 
of predicates�; , the small�r the number of . class ; m�bers , the 
larger the ·nl.}mber · . .of prec1ic, tes .. Wi t11 a claf!!S . o� . two . .  
members , ' the number of conmion properties - that may · be 
_aqstrac'j;ed ·is , inf:l.nite . The cardinality_ . of . t'bis . infinity . 
is p� 0 . (Aq) , since , as we have seen , each of the common . 
propert;ie�;� liiUSt be abstracted cme by one . · While the pro'cess 
of abstrac�:lon .is pot;:entially infinite , the tQtality of 
common properties abstractable is ac·t':lally infinite .  Un4er­
stooQ. intensbnally , my Gedankenwelt. , consists " of ··ill 0 (Ao) 
concepts each of which may cQrttain : t;\! 0 .  (A0) . intensbnal · 
predicates �. Hence � again , the ·. intensio11 of man� in this 
definition � .cone:l.sts :.of -2 (\1 0  = N 1 · (2 A0 = A1) iteJD.s . : · Man 
is essent:I.ally .. infinite--a spiritual , Gestalt whose•:_ca:tdinalit;:y 
is that .. of the contin\1um. 49 
The car!;Iinality, ._tqen , of the individual . person ·is : also tqat 
of the entire space:t�e universe itself--a point made by such 
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thinkers. as Augustine , Pascal , , Bergson • .  and Unamuno � Hartman b�lieves 
he -has here deliionstrat;ed the argument �:lc;>logieally , his demonstration . 
being adapt;ed from Dedekind � s  proof for the existence of infin:l.te . 
systems , ,·which was - earl:f._er \lSed by Josiah ·.Royce . to -d�onstrate the , 
infin:l.ty - ef .- the sel� o 50 . 
It is .. impossibl:e that a concrete , : finite · self could thin,k the 
c!en�era'l:lly infinite -nl.}mber of -, thoughts which Professor ' Hartman seems · 
{+9Har��n; "The Structure -. of ·Value , '.' .. p .· 118 . 
50Hart::man , .  "Four •-Ax�0logical Proofs , "  p ., 433 . 
t:o be saying he must think ·"in order ' to be · a man . "  · None �of ·us would 
quatifY _ as . men according to . this definition !  We d o  not have tne 
capacity to ·� produce a ,  separate . thought corresponding to each of the 
infinite n�ber. C?f items . in the spa;io-teiil.poral worlQ. . · Furthermore, 
there wo�ld nqt be time enough . for the cpnqetely existing person ,-
to · do , tnat m�ch . thinking in a lifetime . 
Professor Edwards . points to basi� diff iculties in the 
epistetl1o,logical proof : 
No individual human , person -can do what Professor . Hartman 
suggests tl)at we all . can do in constructillg a thought world •. 
This obvio\,ls 'point iE;� qisguise.d :.in Hai"tl!lan' s writings . 
beneath -two fundamental ambigu�tie� � the shift between the 
concepts -of potential an.d ' actual . infinity , and , the . absolutely 
devastating equivocation between the · not:ion . of · the concrete 
individu-al human , person ··and the ideal essence of · the ab- . 
st:ra�t:iot} "man o "51 
If Pr:ofessor . H!irtman has shown only tnat each person iS 
potent(ially inf:l,nite in thought :pr0pert.ies , then each person is only 
I '  · - ·  . , 
pote�:ltially .of . infinite value , . according to this proof . It i� 
physically ; i�tel+ectually, an4 telllporally imposs�ble for any 
conc:r�Je p�rson to aGttially fu,lfil,l the :l.nt�nsion of his concept: as . 
set f<n:th , in this definition . Professor Edwards note_s that , "None . 
of this is :even . .red .potential:f.ty for any ' of us . It is at best a · 
I . 
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potentiality in the 1 abstract •• And ,,if llife .. after-death , in which all '-
these deficienci�s are removed , · is .being assumed 1 here , it needs to be . 
said ; expl:!,ctly and defended • .  � •52 · 
51Rem :-B . · Edwards ,  "The Val�e of ... Man:. in . the Hartmanr Value 
System, " unpublisQed .paper , ·university -�f _ Tennessee � -Knaxville , 1971 �  P •. 4 .  . . 
52Ibid. 5 
�·
·  P •  • 
lt :l,s conceivable , arid . -! believe , it ' to be the case , that; 
Profesa�t Hart�an is :·try�ng -.to . bridge r_,the gap . between the -: finit_e 
and the .-infinite self in the Kierkegaatdian sense . 
Only in reaching God by , Faith is our ' inner Self fulfi�led . 
�r s�_lf , t'Qus ;, str�tch�s fro'!D ·· the finite - tq - the i infinite ;  
and Kierk,egaard .shows how· we · can-...,.and ·must--stretch it so . 
For on�y by � reaching the. infinite , . do we . become connected . 
with - the grounc;l of our · ex:f,.stence, , and do we - becem,e trans..:. 
paren� to o'l,lrse!yes.,--do our Selves become themselves . S3 · 
If Hartman is followit;1g Kierkegaard ' s  concept of . the self in 
his valu� system� .then by uniting finiteness with infinity , . he could 
speak of the potential and_ the 1 actual ·· at ,the same · ti'!De in the 
valuation of the human person . Howeve� , · r  am not convinced that 
the , ep ist.emological p�oof , is applicable -. in this. context . : ( I  shall 
ret'l,lrn to thie point shortly . )  
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Since Professor Hartman . has defended the · Kierkegaardian cpncept 
of the self . ·.in hie art icles and . seminars ,  it would . be in order to 
g:f,.ye a bt:ief review of how · Kierk_egaard handles the seeming contra-
diction o� combining fiu_iteness wi._th - infinity in , the same concretely 
exist ing pers<:>n . I rely on the -, excellent work of Re,idar Thomte fqr 
this · task �- According t�;> ' Kierkegaarc;l , the finite self unites with the 
i{lfinite _.self ,.in twa '!Dovements : 
• • • - first· tqe infinite res:l._gua,tbn ,  then . the m.ovemen� -
0f faith . The , infinite resisnatipn i! the· ., brea� with the , 
temporal .- • _ • •  ln , the· infinite r�signation � the -individual 
become� cqnscious , of -his ete�al ;-valic;lity , _ . and : only . for . the 
person :wqo posse�;Jses � such --a conciousne$s_ . can , there . be . a  
quest_ic!>n .. o f  · grasping existence . by  means : of ,_faith . The ·. 
infinity_ res:t,gnat ion is regarded · as ,_the last stage , prior to 
f�_i._th.; 
-
53Robert ·s.  ,Hart'Qlan, _ '-''I.'he · Self �. in Kierkegaard , " . Journal ­
of ,E;xistenti(ll fsychologr, #8 , ._.Spri�g ,  1962 , ·_p . 1 . 
In the infinite- resignation · the .·individttaLresigns·_ · · ·  
the · love which i s  the content;· o f  hi,s life (cf �· �Abraham ' s 1  
sacr.ific_e of; Isaac) and . reconciles . himsel� to · the · pain � 
. 
Then the miracle happens . He make�;} t;he , further -motiol) ;  ' 
he . says , I believe_ that by vi�tu� . of the . absurd �J . shalL receive qack that which ·I surre'Q.der , . for all ·. things . are .· 
poss:t.ble ·:to God . ' The · absurd .must .not ' be regarded .as · a . 
factor within th_e cempass of the und,erstan<;iing . It :. is . 
not i<limt:ica.l, with. the unexpected ; . the . improbable �- or 
the uns�rmi.sed � �en the 1man ef faith .makes the · infinite 
resignatiol) � he . is · co�vinc;;ed hu�anly ·. speaking of ,-the 
impassibility of . any escape . , Tb,e only salvat:f:.on . is by :_ . 
v+rtue of the 1absurd ·whi.ch -h� seiz;es by meaJ;ts ·of �faith. · 
He . recognbes the imposSibility , and · at . the same time 
he believes the , absurd � • • • · 
· 
. . . 
In ,order t;o g�in a - real .understanding of K:f,.erkegaard · 
we _must . keep .. t11e d�_stinction ·between resignation .; and �- . 
faith clear:ly in, �nind . The · distinction is · set . forth : in 
the following passage ; . ' For · the act of , resignation - is - .. -
my eternal consciousness .  • • . • . In resigns tion . .  I make · _  
renqnc!l,atic;m oi · .everythil}S; t�is me\"em�nt L make ; by my ... 
self . � ·  • •  · By faith ·I make renunciation . o:t; .nothing , 
on the ·coQ.trat;y � by .faith 1 acquire eve;'Ything� � • • . �Y· faith Abraham did not renounce his clain upon Isaac ; 
but hy , faitl;l qe got ' Isaac . ' 
l'he infinite resign,atipn , or the infinite surrender ; 
consists· ill t:hat: the , individual · se\l'ers .all t :i,es which 
bind :ttim to t:he tempera! world . • . • • Through the 1 second ·. 
meyement ,  that of faith , th�a individual .. is again . brought ' 
back · to · the temporal (thus · Abraham regained . Isaac . after 
he surre11-dered him) , but now the ; indiyidual liv.es in the 1 
tempo3zl - er ·the fin:l,.te oQ.ly by Y"irt:ue of his · God-relation- .. 
ship . 
Accerding to Kierkegaard--and 'Hart;tila'Q--the individual . who has 
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made the t:wo ,meve�ents weuld ·be , living in . both , finiteness and inf inity 
at the same - time -because ef hb God-relatiQnship , thus the · self is 
b�th , finit_e ·and infinite at 011-ce . 
54Reid�r· Thqmt�,  ·KierkeSaard � s Phil�s��hy : cf Rel±sion , . 
Greenwee4 Prees ; Publishers � New Yor� , 194e ,  pp . 57-�8 �  -
But th� problem of making th;l.s concept ' of ; the self- f it w:f.�h 
Har�rilan ' s  epistemolegical pro!'lf remains , s�nce , he has the , person 
engaged in quantitat�vdy thinking � ·non�enu�erably .. infinite number 
of :, thaugl:lts ,_ an ac_tivi,ty .which is only lqgically possi-ble · at best � 
Clea-rly , the concrete ·per.son :can nat · actually ·· f1,11f ill thie require ... 
ment_. In . the second plac e ;  what Professor .Hartman c�lls an 
epistem9logical proof · is n9t th:e -no:pnal , nature of �pistemolc;>gical 
. . 
pr9blems . Traditionally, epistemological problems have been . con-
cerned with :t�e content and vt:il;l.dity of thinking , - not with t}J.e · 
possible number of · thoughta  which c;an · be thought . I think it might 
be ;asked .w�ether this proof . cC\n legitimately be called an epistemq-
logical proo.f ; or whether the tepn is merely used to label the 
act:ivity of thinking thought� . 
Professor Edwards s tates . that · the quantity of thoughts 
thaught cdoes - not n�ceesarily place men at - a  higher level than some 
Othe� t;hi1.1gs . 
Fl,lrt:Qermare , : we mC\y be able to use ·. the Hartman value 
system to show that men are of l�ss actual valt,1e than 
computer� . If .the act;ual value of an entity depends upon 
the actual number of discrete thoughts which it . can in 
fact think , - th�n comj>1,1t_ers should -be mlich more ,valuable ·. 
than men , . since they can , far out;�do us all · in _ this respect • . 
though they · are sti+l finite . Why \.w()uld . thi$ not - -be a · 
ligitimate application : of the Hartman 1value system? , If we . 
da,s�gree with this outcome , · cQuld -. it · be , because ·we think · 
that value depends upon kind of - properties possessed rather 
than upon number of properties possessed ?55 · 
When we limit 1 persG>ns and compute.rs · to the ; actual process of 
thinking thought;s , _ Professor Edwards , h�s a _ point 
55Edward$ , - �'The Val1,le of Man; " p .  7 . · 
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. .. . .. .. ... 
Other writers ._hav� argu�d · th�t - th�re are ·close · s::IJ;nilaritiea 
betwe�n the_ functions of , the brain , and the -comp
.
uter ' s · ability f�r 
quantitative think::l,ng . 
If t:heJ;"e · is any kind of definite . cause-..auc;l-..�ffect 
:r:el�t io'Qship between .the lifelong . sequence of . elect:ri<;: ­
�ulses leavilflg the brain · and the ·, lif elotig , s equence - of . 
pulses . entering the brain , it can .be - precisely . imple­
mented by a switching network of the . type . that is . known , 
to un4erlie the design of all electronic - digital ­
computers and that at least appears to underlie the 
des::l,gn of the brain ; 56 
Professor Edwards argues further that the application ;_of · the 
epistom.ql,ogical argument "to ·ac�ual . exht ing men not only shows that 
they are of f inite val�e , but ::l,t also shows ' that - they are of u�- -
egual value . -
The act:ual arid _ potel)t:ial thought worlds . of : eJtisting 
men vary immensely . in_ . complexity � .Men·,. are : limite4 by ._ 
the languages . they speak , and some men,. speak . and . thus · 
think . .  more comple:dy than �thers . 
. 
Thus , . the . epistomo.,. 
logical. proof as _ applied ts actual persons : shows that . 
men · are of unegual ·vai�e ; though Hartman � htmself hopes ­
that jle has found a philos0phi.cal proof . of . the . equality 
of - all men· based on the equivalence of infinities of a 
given order , 57 
Hartmaq do�s no� distingu�eh between the ·capacities of - in• 
divi.dual, cenc;:rete men in his arti_cle , put · in •oth�r writings he 
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indica teEt ·that diHerent inc;livi.dual :persons , have , achieved . different 
lev�ls of. selfqood , ·wh�ch would - .suggest that he does value the person 
a�tcor4ing to th� Ges t:alt . which he is _, ranging in degree 9f f irtiteness 
56nean E :- Wooldridge , -Mechanical , Man . ... , The Physical Basis 
of Intelligent .Life, McGraw-Hill Book . Company , New York� 1968 , 
p .  92 . 
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and infi_nity . · The · mar�. intrlns :l,c - one becomes : (IS) I , i . e .  ·.the mar� 
he identifies himself with his th9ughts ,  . the more he lives to him-
. 
' ·  
self - "and . creates hi�self · as an intrinsic universe within himself . "58 • 
Why such an intr:l,nsic univer�e -is ,necessarily inf inite is a -point 
wh�ch Prof�ssor �aTtman, has no(: ·, s1,u;:cessfully ·def.en�ed . Why · could 
not an , intrinsic universe be finite , and yet : be intrinsic and ' 
unique? 
Professor · Hartman waul� · probably ·say that Professor Edwards 
is m&k,ing an extri1,1sic �vall,l�t ion of at:l intrinsic thing (IE) ;  however , . 
the problem remainl!l as to whe�her _ a  con�retely existing person �· 
think •a non'-denumer�ble infinity of tl:J,oughts . - If ·denying the , truth 
of t'Q,is en,tails extrinsic evaluation , then Edwards ,  an� other 
cr�tics of this notion , would r�ply .. that _ it · inQ.icates a weakness . in , 
the system�  nat in the -, crittcisms · of .  it . 
It seel!ls '· ta me th�t the crux of tQ.e issue l:i.es in the fact . 
t�at · while the critics  o:t Har�:man � s - system tend to · speak only of . the 
canc+ete -person , Hartm,an refers to - the person as a sp-iritual Gestalt , 
in the general sen,se o� tha� use� by Kierkegaard , �erdyaev , - and 
sol!lewhat in the . sense' qf Plato ' s  relation of the indivic;lua1 person 
to the ; ideal form of the human person � 1 
In ,regard to , the measl,lring of  dnfinity , HartmE�.n · argues . that 
H cal)not - be dane ·with a finite measuring instrument . For example , 
"From (:he 1 point 9f · view of inf:l,nity , there is no difference between .. 
58aartman , letter ta Pru�tt .  · 
2 , 210, 000, · 2so, ooo, 2 , � � qoo . ooo , · or any 9ther finite . number . Math-
ematical infinity .(iJI0) <:>nly begins "after" the last  countable�_ n1,1m- . 
ber . ·�59  It �s in_ thi!il way that Hartman · tries . to ·av<;)id having to 
a�co11nt for individu,al differences ' and the ; unequal value of persons . 
By treating each human , pers�m as "a ,spiri·tual Gestalt ·whose cardi-:­
nali�y ·is :. ·that · of the cont:f..nuum,, u
60 then each · person . would be equal , 
to every other person ; for all persons would be -infinite . This is 
wha� Hartma\11 atte11J.pts --.to . do .  The · problem. with this effort is that 
he seerns 'to assume what the "Four , Axic:>logical Proofs"  paper is 
attempting to prove . 
Profes�or : Edwards presses Hartman ' s  argument on to its 
logical implicat ions and asks if the :l,ndividual could 1 do. · what Hart-
man· says · he :rnust - be able to . do " "in order to ,be · a man , "  woul4 thie 
not . make : h:lrn equal - with - God? , He thinks Hartman has given 1,.1s an 
epistell\ological ' proof fo.r th� inf inite val1,1e of God , . not man • The-
olpgy holds ·th�t "an actual i�finity of thought :properties belongs 
I .  ' - ' 
properly only - .to . Onu;liscience . u61 Therefore ,  to attribute infinite 
val4e t0, man, on this basis would . be · a sacrilege , in the view of 
tr�ditienal theelogy • 
59Hartwan , Th.e ·  Stru�ture of Value , p .  318 �· 
6DJiartman , "Four , biological Proofs � " p .  433 �  
61 EcJ,waq:ls , "The Value of M.;in , "  p .  7 . 
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Ill . THli; I.OGICAL :. PROOF 
The logical proof , .con�;�;L.4ers JDan . as "the being who has his own 
definition �f himself within himself . "62 
Human indiv_iduals · are · considered to be . inf initely more · 
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valuable than other things since they have · the concept of - themselves . 
within themselves , that is , the human individual - is self-def ining .  
The indiyidual person depicts  the intension o f  his own . proper name · 
when he can def in� himself , att�ibuting to himself all the properties 
which are uniquely his . own and can say ,  ' 'I am myself ; "  or when he 
can , say ' 'I  am not myself , 11 in -which case he means . that the actuality . 
of . his ''myself"  is imperfect in terms of his definition of · his "self .. 1 1  
It  is this capacity to understand oneself in • .  terms of oneself which 
is the distinctive characteristic of ratiol).al human1 beings � and · 
merits for them the category - of "persons , "  and shows . that the human 
person . is more than a mere individual . 63 . 
A chair · certai�ly does not kn9w th�t · it . is a chair , nor does 
a computer know that it is a computer , but I kqow that I .  am I .  ;Even 
Frieda the cow , _does not know that she is uniquely . herself for · she is 
unable to reflect upqn herself . But Hartman1 argues ; as a · human 
person I am not only able tq refl'ect .upon -myself , "I  can . reflect upon 
my reflection of myself ' .and upon my reflection of ·· . my reflec tion of 
myself , .and so on ad . infinitum. 1164 Logically, this successive 
62Hartman , 
63Hartman . ' 
64:aa.r.tman, 
"Four 1 Axio1ogical Proofs , "  
"Singular an� Particular , "  
"Four -Axiological Proofs , "  
P •  433 . 
p . 10 . 
P •  433 . 
reflection of orie�elf coul<;I . go on inf initely , and since . e.;�.ch ; such 
reflecti1;m is : itself - a definite item of tho'l,lght , the ., series is ·. 
enumerable , and thus the whole ' succession of · thought items is . an in.,. 
finite d�numerable series - with cardinality A0 (f\( 0) .  65 
Although the series of ,reflections , � anq refl,ecti.ons . upon - tqe 
refle�tion�:� '·should - continue . ad infinitum , the h�an-; person who is 
doing the thinking is alw.;�.ys h�mself different iated , from ,his 
reflections · of : himse_lf , so · th�t his refl-ections . never cover the 
t:ot�lity �f his pe;-son � There is - alwaya, ' remaining the - Self which 
does the · thinking .  lt. is at this point that Hartman introd1,1ces his 
employt11.ent -.of ·the theory of types ,  a :maneuver , the validity of . which 
some cr:t.tic_l:! haye · q1,1estioned . 
According to the fundamental axiom of the ; theory · of , 
types t whatev�r • in"'fQlV�S .!!.!. of a cellection .must not - . 
be one of the - collection ; the , thinker must  n�t , lqgically , 
be part ef the �set of his : po�sible �theugh� obj �cts , in 
particular , nor ; of the set . of his autQreflectic:>ns�.,.the 
set - of ·his refl,ection upon the reflection .upon - • • •  tl).e ­
reflect;ion :,of himself . Th�t which thus refers to a+l of . 
a cell,.ection i�;� of a , higher logical order , than the col� 
lect,ion .,.66 
Accor1U,ng . to -this logic � ·if the coll.ec tion it self has the 
cardinali�y ef :Ag ( W 0� , ' · the higher order , i : e .  the , Self which does 
the , thinking , woutd have · the :f,nf ini te yal�e of A0 . ( � l) • 
Prefessor Edwards critic:t.zes - Professor HartJilSn � s  attempt t:o 
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get · mere 'met;aph:rsicl!l-1 ' mil.eage 0u·t , of the theory of types . th�n Russell. 
wou+4 · have ·  ili1Sgine9, possible . For . as ·.previously · noted , . Hartl)lB.n argues · 
65Ibid . 
66.!if.4_. 
t;ha� the - tl\ink.er of �he .,dertUIIlerable s�ries of reflections ·· cal_lnot . 
h:i,mself b� a member· of the series � "this · being forb:i,dden ' by - the 
theory of types , . t;he �self . that · .. does . the th:i,nking must be of a ,  
higher logical_ crrder • This higher. 9rder , Eqwards argues . is · a meta- . 
s�lf. . and . tl)at · .if one mus t: belc;>ng to a second , order of il)finf;ty i� . 
grder ' to think_ about ' the first prqer of infinity , ' th�n it - sqould · 
follow , that · -.he must · bela,ng , to a tQ.:i,rd order before · he can . think 
· about a secpnd ,orde� , and a fourth . order �n order . to think about . a 
t;hi'r;d - order� .and · so on to ad, i��initwn� 67 
S�ilarly , if I must � be nol)-spatial in· order , to . think 
or tal1t about l the whol.e · of space , anq non-temporal . in · 
order etc;> think al;>out 1 the whole ,.of ·time ;- would ,;not tP,e s�e · 
patterQ. of reason
-
ing prove t:ha� I must · be ,non-real . in order 
to thil)k about the whc;>le of existen�e ,  beyon4 being to . 
t11ink a.bout ' the whole ' of ..being ? What is the d:i,�fer�nce 
between .being non�rea� or beyon4 reality , existence and 
being an4 just pla'in unreal . or no'Q ... axiatent? .. Does . the 
proof shpw f inall;y the non ... existencre oL the· Self ?6B' 
If this · crit:i,ciSlP can1;1c;>t be answered , then it - would seem that 
Hartman-' � liJ?-e of .argUIIlent . necessar�ly generates -, in ·inf inite regress 
of S�ves or Thinkers " 
Can t�e Self ' or _ the Thinker hav.e · any knowledge of . or 
thoughts about him.s-elf at .,.all?  If not ,  . then it . can never 
be known , as ·req�ireq " by ,  the theory of . types , . so why : wo�"rY 
a}>qut ,)it ? l( so , : tl"len·._ an · inf inite -regress - a.f Selves -. seeJil . 
to be generated • ' In a ·self · of " second � order . iufinity is . 
requ:i,red befo;e I can ' talk ' or · tbink about � a  self o£: . first 
orqer infinity , ,then � th,is ·.proc��s can ' be , repeated to · 
infinit:y ; and · an : infinite · series of . selves , meta-selves , 
a�d ·me�a--m.eta-�elves 'is - generated . · Somewhere· . along , the way , 
we see� to h,ve lost all · contact with the i concretely existing 
indi.vid\lal \ humal) persoti. . �9 · · 
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67Edwan;ls , "�ne Value ,of Man i,n th.e Hartmal_l Value System, " · p .  8 .  · 
68Ibid o._ ,  P o 10 .- Italics mine . 
69Ib:i.d a . 
-..-......-.. 
Hartman ' s  explanat�on and possible escape from the seeming 
neceslil�ty of -an . infinite regre�s of �eta:-selves ,may be found · in ,  
his argument that the prG>perties by which a , person -is .measured are ·  
a� the i same � time ::p:rep�rtiea within the person , thus el�minaUng the -, 
need ,_for me.�a-f\lelves , since - -.all · concepts - of . the self belong to the ­
one self . He .has attempted , to show in , his study - of belief ·as a 
value propetty?O tqat whil e . the second--order properties (also 
called higher-order , properties) , .  such-, as the contents . of belief , 
while they cannot define identity , . are always_ the value prol>erties . : 
34 
As we have .. seen , in the Hartmaqian . system, it is t4e value prqpertiee 
' . . 
which make · the difference , , and these �.higher-order . preperties ,  even 
though they are ;,-not part · of ;_the defin�tion qf the identity ef two 
things ,  .yet � proper tie� of the things . 
It is. a -value property o{ myself to believe , that ·.- the world 
is good or , that it is , bad ; ; in -the first . case ! . am an optim:l.st , :  
in . the sec�nd a - pess�ist . '  Indeed • as Jesus , Kant , and others 
have · held ,  ' the content of : certain o�_ my beliefs · defines my . 
morality •. These ·exa�ples only · conf irm what is logically prob­
ablEb . 'that higher-order 'properties of a person are v�l1,1e 
properties ; , that · it seems c�rtain · that content(:s . of : belief are 
value - propert ies of the believer . 71  
Using the , well-.:-known · example of  Epimenides the Cretan , who . said 
that every Cret•n is a liar , · Hartman explain� , 
As .the saying of Epimenides is a property of Epi.IDenides but 
refers to the tot;al+ty said ; . . so . the, belief . of Epimenides is 
. a  pr'oper'ty ; of . him and ., refer§ to .. the tota:Uty believed . · It ­
cannot ,  th�ref�re ,  be a part of tha� totality . Ra�her -, the -
70Robert S . Hartman, "Belief as a Value ·.Property ; '' - unp1:1blished 
paper , Centro de Est�dio� Filosoficos · univers�dad Nacional Auteno� 
de Mex;ico o · 
71rb:td . , p • .s .  · 
totality ,.. precisely :by ,being both . senJe · and . ref�rence oL 
the belie� , qualif:f,.es . the . belief , -which. in� turn ... qual:J_fiea 
the , beli�ver. Henc:e the content :,of ; the . bel�ef b a .  . 
secondary property; of the bel:J_ever . And . as su� it is · 
not · the kin� Qf property th.at ·defines · ide.ntit::y . 7 2 
U t�is be tr:ue , th�n it , is not the case · that self-reflection 
necessitate.s · th� existence of ,meta�selves which - reflect upon reflec-
tions , .  since the . content of a reflection does , not · contain him who 
believes , but . is contai�ed by him as a secondary . property \ (a .val�e 
prqperty) . 
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E.dwards , argues · th�t: even if _we gr�nt · Hartman ' s  argument . up 
to- this ·  point , we still are , not forced to: conclude that th� :self is 
inf in:f,te · in · th,,mght properties , . apprGpd.aticms ; choices ,  rdlections ; 
self�:reali�atiQns , etc , 
For · a��. ��.sual ccmcre�.e hu�ap· beins� r; the ,� g�ven thought world alway� will -be .f init.e ;  the ·acts. of . apprapriation will . 
be finite ,· the , range of choices ;.wili .: be ;finite;  - tl;le ': reaL 
potent;ial:Ltie$ for- self�real:-iZation ;will . be,-� f inite�"='hdwever 
i!¥l;�nse or ,indef ini,te.  . And the -seV ' a£ . a . l()�iclill -· order . higher tlia1;1 euc11 a f inite - set nee.d . only to .be . a  stil l - higher 
fioite• ' Otder of ' logic�! . entities in , otder to satisf:y . the . 
rectqirements 9f the · theory , 0f . types • .  Furthermore , there .may, 
still. be a sense in which ind:l,vidual . pe:rsons . are . _ !. richer in . 
properties f and · thus· ' better·' · than · things and systems , �-
!f 'J,llSJil · are finit e .  73 · 
Profe�sor . Edwards aeks· if it i'ifn ' t possible to give a t4!1Dporal . ! * !· 
account of. eel� knowledge · W'h:J.ch satisf ies the requirements Of the· 
theory of. , type� , ·without foll<;lwing �rtman in looking_ for an inf inite 
self , and goes on to explain that - Charles Rartsho�ne and otQers . 
influence.d · by ,Whitehead have given alternative not ions . of · the nature 
72Ibid . 1 .. p .  ·4 . - . 
73.Edwarc;l� , · "T�e Vall,le of Man·, '' pp . 10-lL 
of the _ s�lf which make it · pqssi\'>le tQ refer to �one ' s  self wit�out , 
the necessity . of introducing an infinite self . 
Hartshorne contend� , for example , that , the . sel� of 
the · present moment , in the strictest in�elligible sense 
o� the ' present moment , ' . can never literally .kndw, talk · 
about , or think ab<;>ut 1 -itself , sinee . all . i�trospective 
reflection is - actually ,retr0spective reflect ion :on the ; 
innnepiately past st;ates of the present self , and since 
the self �hi�h, in · time - begins to .. think the \ tp9ugbt 'my 
presen� self ' is .alre�dy , in the past :,by the time that 
thi!il tho1,1ght ,_ is completed .-7 4 · 
Hartman wou�4 not argue · with this notion - so long ·as . it is ' ' ' 
remembered - that: here is .'one of . three ways of . relating oneself to 
to one ' s :.own thqughts . ,  
A perfton ma� hav� , t:o his .. own thoughts , . all . three . 
value . rel�tio�s , systemic , extrinsic , . intrinsic • .  He · 
may- just think about his - thoughts ;  . or he :may� classify 
them or- he may identify himself . with . them : 
S S S E , (Is. ) I .  . . (I  ) , . (I ) , 
The latter . is th� intrinsic' experience .,of . one ' s  own ·: 
thoughts .  The more · one poes thb the .more , one ·. l:fves . .  
in oneself and creates himself as an intrinsic universe 
within hi�self � 75 · 
3.6 
According to Hartma� , · Professor �rtshorne ' s  analysis would · 
be ·the secc;�nd (IS) E :vall,le rel�tion to one ' s , self , i . e . , an extrinsic ' 
. �� . ' ' 
ya1uation o:Lone ' s self. In intrinsi� valuation (I�) E ,  one · would · 
unify .o.r synth�size ,  · th� infinite moments - of · one ' s ' existence . So , �  
I ' .,. ' 
• 
inst�ad of f inite p�ssix:tg moments , one is a Gestalt � . an intrinsic 
; '  .., ; ' ' 
univer�e.  Thus ,  . for · �artman , it is a r:f,cher valuation . ,  In ·.fact ; 
he censiders th� logical . proof with. its ,  definition · of - s�lf.,.reflex;l:vity 
74Ibid . , p . ll .  _ 
75Hart:Iila�, ·le�ter .. to Pruitt . 
one , _of the stronger argu:wents  for the , inf inity of ,the human · person � 
The · infinity : of the person rests . in - the last resort 
oq its .. self':"reflexivity , that is , . the defin;tion of the -
person . as that being which has i�s own definition of 
itself w:f,.thi� , itself . From thif? follows ,. everythit:tg . 
The pred,icates , thet;efore ; by which the quality of the 
person is meast,J.red are : at - the -- same , time - properties within 
the person - · as - is ·not the case : . . with a non:-reflective 
tldng � 76. . 
This capacity of the , person for determining himself the -
predicates ,by which he is -p�easured is Hartman .: s an!;!wer , to critics 
\ 
sucb as Mueller who asks what is the - relat ionship between a thing 
and its intension , i , e . , its e�positional predicates . 77 , Mueller 
wants - a  list of those ( pred:l,cates to : be set up and justified outside 
the persqn so t�at he might , be measured by · th�t concept , whereas 
in E:artml:!-n 1 s valuatio17- • ' the predicates by which the quality of . a 
person - is m17asured are · at .. the same · time properties within him.  The · 
person -is - singular and cannot be adequately measured in the usual 
conceptual sen�e . His de:f:inition is - "a : ' unic;:ept �- , an experiential 
enti�y representing one thing in : its un:l,queness . u78 
W o THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF 
The ontological proof · consid��s m�n · as - "the l ¥rr�r of -_ all 
things'' 79 in that he . is th� interpreter _of  his environment , the · 
determiner ef his . destiny , and the · b'l,lilder Qf h:f:.s - world • . 
77RQb�rt -w. _ Mueller ,,"The ·.Axiology ,of .Robert ,s.  Hartmaq : .A 
Crit:i,�al Study , '' The · Journal, of Val1,1e Inguiry, I (Spring • 1968) . 
78�ar��n, "Value TQeory as a ,  Fonnal System, '' p .  300 .  
79Hartma11- , "Four Ax:l,ol�gical Proofs , '' p .  4�4 . 
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Hartllla� usee an extended quotation frolll - Giovanni ·_ Pico della 
Mirandola · to _ express h�s concept of man, the Illir�or of all , things : 
At last it seems . t9 me , !  have come to understand why 
man i6l the , most , fort;unate .<;�f . creatures .and consequen�ly 
worthy of all admiration and what precisely . is th�t 
rank which is his · - lot in . the , universa� chain 'Of Being . • • ._ .  
God : .. • .  o • h�d already built this · cosmic·  home , we behold . • · •  • 
But when the work ' was. finished , . the Cra�tsman kept wishing 
that there were someone to .ponder the plan - of so great a ­
work; . to love its b�auty , and to wonder at its vastness • •  
H� therefore · took ·man as a . creature - of indete:r:minate · nature 
and � o ' • •  addre.ssed him thus : ' Neither . �  f ixed abode no\:' a .  
f<:>Qt, that · is thine alcme , not a1;1y function · pecl,lliar to thyself 
have we given thee , Adam, . to the . .  end that · . according to thy · 
longing and , according to tl)y · jud�ent thou mayest have .· and 
possess what abqde , what · fonn, and . what· . functions thou thyeelf . 
shalt . desir� o The nature of all other beings is · limited and 
constra;Lned . within the bounds of laws prescribed by. Us . Tha)U , 
constra�ned by no limits , in accordance with tQine - own free 
will , in -whose hand We have placed thee , shalt ordain for thy­
self the limits of thy nature • .  We have . set - thee at the world ' s ,  
center that · thqu mayest .. from thence ·.more ' easily observe what- · 
ever is · in . the world . We have .made · thee .neither of . heaven 
nor of earth , neither mortal nor immortal , so that with _ freedom 
of choice a1;1d with honor , as · though , the maker - and - molder of 
thyself , thou mayest fashion . thyself in whatever shape · thou 
shalt . prefer . ThQu shalt have the power to degenerate into 
the lower forms , of · life ;  which - are b�utish . Thou shalt , have : 
the power , out \ of thy soul ' s  judgment , . to .be , reborn into the 
higher forms ·.which are _, divine • .  (Giovanni , Pico della Mirandola , 
Orati<m, on the Dignity of .Man, The Renai!sance Ph:f,.lesophy. af . 80 Man� :Ernst Cassi�er et; al . ,  eds . , · Ch:f.cagq , .19�8 , pp . 223ff . ) . . 
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This definitio� por�rays man1 as · the creature who . tranecends the 
tot.lity of all · otQer created things�  He involves it all . in · that he , 
"pen�ers , "  "praises ; "  and "ebserves� the . "cempleteness" and the , 
"f in�lity" of • creation . He has · the freedom . and · the capacity for 
cQange : . he . has h:J,mself ·as his task · tG. be f�lf illed ; i o  e .  to detet'I!line :, 
his axiolegic�l val,ue by, appropriating , or making himse�f into , 
sorbid �- , - PP . 434-435 . 
whatever level . . of creation he desires � By hi_s . own will. he may 
qonstitute .himsedf "as any combination :.or · pe]imut�tion of tl,le · inten":" 
sional properties of creat�d things . "81 Furthermore , . it : is _he ·who 
val4es cr,eated things , giv�ng tl,lem status in te.rms : of · himself . 
Professor Hartman · argues � .acearding to the theory of . types , 
that since the . tatality .of . intensiona1 prapert:f:es of created . things ; 
as wel� as the · things . themselves , is at mest , : of �ca]:'din�lity A0 
( W a> , t}Jen the human person who is of .a higher logic�! order tl),an 
tl:le · to�alit,y of created things and their properties , must ·, be at .. 
least. of ca.rdinali1:y · Al ., ( \ij 1) .  Man ' s  val\,le is :. therefore that of a 
· non-denumerable ca,ntinuum·, a sp;ritual Gestalt , equal in -value to 
the whole , universe :of sp�ce · and time . 82 
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In this context , t�e ·human person is  logically ,and · potential�y 
unimpeded , "so t�at with fr,eedom of . choic;:.e and with honor , as though 
t�e maker a]ld molder of thyse�f ; thou mayest fashian thyself in what­
ever shape t}_lou sh,alt , prefer . "�3 · But since - the issue of freedom for 
the cencret�ly eJC;isting person is far from se�tled , and: if Hartman · 
we�e · applying this · arg�ent · to . empirical per�ons , in - their finiteness , 
we could jus;ly accuse him af · making an -un¥arrante� assumptton . But .  
Har�man. see�ng tl;le persan � as · a singular tl:l.ing in � all of h�s po,si- · 
, 
bil_ities ; wan�s ta �apprehend the , singular _ in · the fullnes s  of its · 
8l.Ibid • , ' P .  435 ......,..._ . .  
82 Ibid • 
..-._.... 
83roid . ,'" p .  434 . 
� .  
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c�ncretiot.l , · in , its  t(i)tal , Gestalt , '�84 thus , . the human, person -hal;) the -.: 
ontel.egical c�pacity ot mak�ng himsel! in�a - whatever ·type . of ·. persen · 
he wantfil to be . 
Prefessor : Dwight .Van de Vate ; . along with eth��s , has presented , 
alter:nat!.ves ,te -Hartman v s  notio"Q af u•lil!lited freedom for the indi-
vidual o · Van de Vate ' s  argumen�. is that the ·person ' s  �trroring of all : 
th�gs in his -cexperience is de�ermined ·to · a l�rge degree by his en-
vironment ,  th,at is , "being a persen . is · a  reciprecal affair • •  , · ,  
The dependence , of the ind�vid�al persen on o�hers is absolu.te : .  his 
being a person is cen�erred on ,him by the�. At the same · t�me , how­
ever � each of tl;lem is equally . dependen� upon him. "85 When we say 
that a person : is the miq:or o� all . things , in thi� context , we a+e · 
saying that ) 1e · reflects · his cend.it i�ning , and in this sense , he could ·. 
not be sai� te be free and : wholly in ., centrol o:f his · "self-determina-
tion • ',' "Self-deten;dnation" from thi!\1 per�pective would be · a misnamer � 
If it ceuld be cproved th$,t -man ' s  mirrering is · s�ply - his reflection 
of ht,s · cendit1.enii_lg , then the · individual-, ,is fit?-ite ,. not inf inite . 
Hartlllan , of c�urs� , valuing intr_insicalJ,.y (rJ:) ; weuld .. say 
' 
tl:lat Van . de , Vate � s  analys :l.s ef :_persGnheod ' is an ex�rin�ic valuat.ion 
ef an � intr�nsi� thing (I�) . Hart�n· sees the. person as being auto-
nomeua , · stand1.�g eutside his environment , and · even outside - the 
prepert�es by which he makes up his own character - much the same · as 
84Har�man , "The · Legic : of Value , '·' p .  408 . 
85Dwight, Van ,_ de · Vate ,- Persons; Privacy; and Feeling, 
Memphts St�te Unive�s it� Pres s ,  Memphis , 1�70 , pp . 113-114 . 
one , stands ou�side oth�r . things and persons · and: evaluates them 
according tQ the intensio�s of :their concepts . 
The question whether we make · a  distinction - between 
the : individual an� the -.praperties . of .. the individual is 
t�e old question of Berkeley , and : it refers t� anyt.hin$ , 
e . g . ; . a  chai� . Do we ·make · a  disti�ction .betwee� the 
chai� . and . . the prepet;ties . of the · chair ? ,  I think we : do . 
'J.'he .,chaiJ; is th._e · sul;>j ect of .wb,ich ,,the propet;"ties are . · 
predicated . The · individual · is .the subj ect of , which i�s 
preperties - are predic�ted . The properties are : that · which 
is h�d · by , the subjeqt ; ·· Since . there is a .  difference between 
the -, praperths -of :. the thing and the . predicate · in the . inten­
s ion of .the thing ' s -concep t; ,  the thing possesses value in 
th� degree in whic.h ·it �. has the pr�perties �. that · correspond ' 
to the se_t . of :predicates in � the in_tenEdon of its concept •. 
A ·ch.a.ir may not have the ·, properties of . a chair ; and a 
person may. not :have the · prQperties . of ·a  person , · e . g . ; a 
moron� or . a  crimina�. who \ defines h
.im.sel,f :as . "I ·am .a nori-:­
rational being'' or "I am not \ I" .· Depending on ,how many or 
l • • . 
hq_w· few pro})erties the person :. or the thing ha� , he _maS be. a - good , a , so-so , : a  b�d , or a no-goad person or thinS • 6 
Har�man: , is clt;lse to Berdyaev who has sl)c;>wn 1 that · the human., 
. ... .. . . 
person · as · he · is known to biology , psych�logy � · and sociology , is a 
na�ural , · social . being ; he ; is - th� offspring of the world and of . the 
processes which take pla�e · in �the world . But · 
• • • m�n · as .  a person , , is 'not a ·  child of the · world , he 
is · of ,_anoth,er origin .  - Anq this :l,t :,is · thS:t .makes man· a 
riddle . Pet;"sonality is a brea� thr0ugh , . . a bre.aking · in . 
upon:. this ·.�orl4, ; it ;. is · th; introduct ion . of . something new . 
Pe�sonality is not ,nature � ·  it doefil not - belong to . the .· 
obj ective . hierarchy of  nature , as .a subordinate ,. part . ·of · 
of it :' o �- o · Man is personali;y · not . by uatur·e .but ·�by ' 
spirit � o • •  o . Perse<!nai�ty is a -mic;.roc0sm,  .. a . complet� 
univ�ree .  It is  personality alone ' that - can . bring . together 
a Ut).ive;sal : COntt;nt at).d '·be \ .a pottmtial. -un:f,yeJ\se in an 
individua� £o�. 87 . 
86Har1:man , ,  lett;er ta. Pruitt • .  
87Nikola::t. Berdyaev ,  Slavery and . Freegom» . tran�lated · from. the 
Russian by . R  • . M • .-. French, . Char�es Scribner ' !'! · Son� , · New · York, 1944 , 
P ·  21 . 
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Hat:tma� dist:f.nguishes be1:ween the , eJttrinsic category of tbe · . , ,  ' ' . 
concret� · human person and .:_the axiological category af . the person 
. .  
42 · 
as a "spiritu�l Ge�tal� whose ·cardin,<jllity is t�at af the _ cont�p.uul!l . "88 
As th_ese .are d:l,fferent .. ways .of · valuing., · so only -, intrinsic valuation 
is - adequate : for t�e a;ciol�gical · category . Going furth!!r' in his 
discussi<?n - of . this . d isti_nctic:m ,  Berdy�ev , adds : 
Per'-sQnality i� an aJ_tblagical cat;egory , a category , 
of value o Here .we meet th� fundame�tal paradox in 
the .-exist.ence. of personality . Persanality must · constr�ct 
it eel� � · enrich itself , fill it.sel� wit}t universal . content , 
achieve_ unity :i.n .whole}lese in tqe whole exten� of its 
li�e .  But for thie , i t  . muet ·. already exist � There must 
originally .. exist th•t subj.ect ,which is called. upon to 
cqnstruct ·. itse+f . Personality is - at · thE! beginning of : 
the raad . and it · is only. at _the end of the road . Person­
ality · is not made up of parts , it is .not · an aggregate , 
not a : composition , it ,is a primary whole � The growth of  
pereonality , the re�lization of .personality certainly 
does not mean the formation of · a .whole out of its parts . 
It me�ns rather the creative acts of . personality , as a 
whole . thing � which is not - braught out of : anything and not ­
put t0gether from anything . The form of personality is . 
integral , i� is present -- as a whole · in ,all . the acts of . 
personality , Bersonality h�s a unique , an unrepeatable fortnj Gestalt o 9 · 
The extr:i,nsic category af the individual - is the common , out-
ward adherent universal . ·  The extrinsic -aspect , of personality is 
generic , belonging to the human- race ;  to history , tra�:f.tion , society , 
class �  family , heredity , imit,tion . But the , intrinsic , the inward 
universal persenality .!'must perform its self-existen� , or:(.ginal , 
creative acts p  and th_is alone < makes it personal�ty . and constitutes 
its ·1 unique •value o n90 
89Berdyaev , p .  23 o 
90rbid � . ,  . p • .  2�. 
V � THE TELEOLOGICAL PROOF 
The teleolegical ' proof is based upon - th� definition o� the , 
individual person �as a self-actualizing being . 91 Here the Self is 
an . "ail!l , 11 a "task; 11 a 11choice , " · to itself . This notion is expounded 
with . some , variation by s4ch psychologists . as Goldstein ,  Rogers , 
Angyal p Murphy , Allport . and :Maslow. In phi�osophy , Kierkegaard · is 
per�aps · the leading exponent . His ethical definition of man· shows 
him . . in th� 81transparency" of his teleological self-determination . 
Hartman· quotes Kierkegaard ' s  definition of the , ethical as a paradigm 
of · the concept · of . self-act4alization : The ethical is seen 
• • • . as that . by which : a . man becomes whl(lt he ,becomes . 
The ethical then . will not change t�e individual into 
another man ; but -makes him - himself • • • • . It · is essential 
to a . man who is , to live - ethically that he becomes, so 
radically cqnscious , of ·himself that no a4ventitious t�ait . 
escapes him.  
He who has et;hic;:llly ,_chesen an4 fou11d hU,lsel� has . 
himself as he is det�rmined in his whole concretion . He · 
has hi111self , then , as an inc;lividual : who has these talent.s ,  
t�ese . pass�ons , theee : inclina,tio�s , these . habits , who is ­
under . these in{luences ; who in ! this - direct:f,.on is affected 
thus , . in . another thus • . . Here , then , he .has hUilself as a 
tas�, in , such : a sort that the . task ,, is principally to order , 
cultivate ;  temper , en�indle ;  repress , in short , tQ bring 
about , a  proport ionality in - the soul , a harmony � which · is 
the fr�it , of · the personal virtues . Here the aim of his 
act�vity is himself , but · not as arbitrarily determined , 
for he has himself .as - a  t�sk which is set for him , even \ 
though ' it · has become his .by fact · that - he .has cbos�n it . 
But although he himself . is - his . aim ,  this aim is · neyerthe­
less anoth�r , for the self . which is the . aim is , not an 
abstra�t self which f its everywhere ,and · h�nce .. nowh�re , 
but a . concrete �self "which stands in rec:f,.procal relations 
with these. surroundings , 'these cC?nditions of lif e ,  this · 
91Hartman-. "Four ·Axiological Proofs , "  p .  435 . 
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nat\lral � order . • • , • The , ethi�al individual so lives · 
that · .he · is constantly pa�sing . from one , stage to the 
other . If · the ind�vidual has - not originally under� 
stood . himself as a . concrete ,personality in continuit� , neither will he acquire this subsequent contin�ity . 9 
The self as a task which - is �o be .. actualized is � the ideaL 
self , anq the , self whic� actuali�es it is t�e concrete self . The 
I 
self knqwing itself � is action � Self-realization , or . the synthesis 
which resul�s  wh�n the self constitqtes itself , is a process , ful­
filling definite · states . 93 The · individual person . "is at once the 
actual self and the . ideal self which the individual has · outside him-. . , 
selt as the picture in likeness t� which he . has to form himself and 
which , on the other hand , . he nevertheless  has in him since it is the 
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self . Only withi"Q him has the · individual · .the goal after which he has 
to strive , and yet he has his goa� outside him ,  inasmuch · as he � strives 
after . it . "94 The self which the individual knows is the concrete self , 
but it is also the ideal self ; or the pattern accqrding to . which he i� 
to mold , himself . As a pattern it . lies in a sense .. outside of the .. 
indiyidual , yet ,. it , is part · of him as something which is his . possession , 
�-
his self . 95 "Man is a · being who surmounts ·and . transcends himself. 
The realization of personality in man · is ; this . continuous transc�nding 
of . self . "96 
92soren Kierkegaard , E!thel['/Or , VoL II , tran�lated by , 
Walter Lawrie , Prince�on ; 1944 , pp . 212 , 219 . 
93Har�ma'Q , "Four Axiolegical Proofs , "  p .  436 .  
94Kie�kegaard , Eitherior � �val • .  II ; p .  217 . 
95Thamte ;  p .  49 . 
96Berdyaev ; p .  29 • .  
Hartman - argues that e,ch moment of t�is self-�ealization is 
a moment . in - the life process ,of th� person ; and no matter how small 
tqese moments . may be det�rmined , they are still - enumerablf , so 
according to the theory of types ,  the process of sel{-reatization 
is a series -of · cardinality A0 (N 0) , but ·. as Hartman interl'rets the 
th�ory , of types , the Self which : chooses and becomes the . totality 
of these moments · is . of a higher logical order ; th�refore , his 
Mueller accuses Hartman of incon$istency when he wtites .of 
self-ftJlfil,lment , but do�s not give an "obj e�tive criteri!m'·' by 
whi�h one may, know - whether or not · he ·has achieved the level of "a 
good man, " for we know from Hartman · not what fulfills a peJ;"son , but 
only - that _ it - is .better for a person . to be l fulfilled then not -. to be , 
fulfilled o "98 Mueller ' s  critic:t,sm would indicate ; that he has not 
grasped the distinctions betwe�n the various , kinds of goopnesse• 
in the Hartmanian system.  The expressicm . "obj ective crit�rion" ,is 
not in Hs.rtman ' s  systemo "A ·criterion is always something of 
application and . thus cannot - possibly in- my sy�tem be obj ective . rr 99 
There - are all kinds of goodnesses of man: "A man· is 
a good man'1' is entirely different .depending . on whether 
man is regarded as systemic , ext;rin,ic or intJ:'insic -value , \  
If · it : is ·an : extrinsi� valt,1e • •  · •  then .good \is meant 
axi�logically but not - morally ; and the same · would be the . 
97Har�man, "Four ·AAiological Proofs , "  p .  436 . 
98Mueller , p .  26 . 
99Rebert s. Hartman , lett�r te . Prefessor Robert W .  Mueller , 
dated Oc�ober 28 ,  1969 • 
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case,  only . more so , in a BY!itemi� -not ion of �man , for 
example . as homo sapiens . But if . "man'.' .  is .meant in­
trinsically , that is , morally then we have (1)  to 
def ine ;_man as a · person t (2) a person as that bei�g 
which has its own - def inition - of . itse�f .within itself , 
(3)  this de�inition . being "I am I ; "  and (4) th� ful� 
fillment of this definition as a person . actualltl being 
himself , i . e . , honest ; sinee�e , genuine , etc • lO 
· · 
Th� valuation used in 1 this . fourth proof is , of course , 
intrinsic t The · person · wi11 .be the mare maral · the more h� fulfills 
h!!. co�cept of his Self . The kind of - ethics th�t results from 
fot1!18.1 axiol�gy is that; of Kant , Kierkegaard and Scl).eler . "The 
maj ority of traditional ethics do not be!ong . here .but into t�e 
fields of value psychology , sociology , and metaphysics . "�Ol As we 
have seen , intrinsic value is the value _of a th,ing that · fulfills a 
singular cC!Incept . A singular concept , or a prol?er name ; is .no� a ·  
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concept in the usual sense , for it is not a .. mental ·entity that grasps 
to�ethet th� common features of sev�ral . things . It is rather "a , . .  
' unicep t , ' an experiential entity representing one t thing in its 
unique�ess . 11102 
What Mueller seems te demand is what Ha.rtman,; following Kierk�-
gaard � says : is · impossible ,  i . e � , that no extrinsic ethical , norm . 
could predicate - for the . indiyidu�l ·what - he ,ought to d� , or .be . An 
extrinsic -value systel!l is applicabl� to individual persons . only _when . 
we see · each person as a : class of funetions , as in psychalagy . l03 A 
100Ibid . 
lOlHai�man , The Structur� of Value � p .  308 . 
102Hart�n� "Valu� Theory . as . a  Formal System, "  p .  300 . 
103Hartman� Th� Structure af . Valu� , p .  307 . 
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syst�mic - value system can be , applied to human person� only if we 
ccmsider the . individual as :.a system, as ' in - physiel0gy , in all , of 
its aspects , "frel!l the study of - the human body - to that of , robots . "�04 
An obj ective value system whi�h could be applied to the individual 
person is !�possible when he is see� �n his singular uniqueness ,  
£� . s ingular or intrinsic value _ is the value of -uniqueness .  To in-
sist on valuing the - individual in terms of extrinsic �or systelllic · 
norms is to mistake · the nature of the .. individual and his . ethical 
requirements a • Such lc;�gic does net -, actually .come , into vita� ccmtact . 
with the real individual person , enly - with . the schema of man . There 
is on-l-y one reality __ te . which an infinitely exist ing person l!lay - sus-
tain . mere ( than· a cognitive relatic;�n , and that is . his own reality or 
the fact · th�t he exists . T9 every other reality he - stands in ; 
cognitive relatienship o 
Hartman and : Kierkega�rd are · close i� their unqerstanding of 
the . self - as being derived , n<;�t from society , but from God J05 
Therefore , the task of self-realization i� not , to develop a self as 
defined � or determined , by one ' s .envi�enment , - but to fuse - the , finite -
with the infinite � thus the self knows its own . self . A tr�ly 
systeJ!liC view of the . human person belongs - en+y to God ,  "for only -, He 
can embrace : within His eternal . vision the breadth , temporal span , 
an4 s�er,ets of - existence and - becoming . "l06 
104ryid o ,  pp . 309-310 . 
l05cf o ·Hartman , "The Self in . Kierkegaard , p .  1 ;  '� alsQ , Thomte !  s 
, 
. 
Kierkegaard ' s  Philosophy of Religion, . esp . , pp . 204 f f .  · 
106James1 Colltns , The Mind of Kierkegaard ; Hen+Y Regnery 
Company, (Chic;ago , 195 3) ,  pp . 128-12 9 o  
For Hartman , as with Kierkegaard , sel�-actualization cannot 
be separated from faith . In , discussing the realization of one ' s  
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true self � Hartman refers to Kierkegaard ' s . last - stage which is called 
faith ap.d defines it as "the self relating itself tq its own self--
(an4 not - to the min� or its obj ect ,  the . worlQ ) --and being willing 
to be itself , thus being t�ansparently .srounded in the Power which 
c�nstitut�s the self.  · In other words ,  t\le self being knowledge , 
when it loses : the obj ec�. of its knowing , is , pure , knowledge , trans-
parent awareness rest ing without any . worldly obj ec� without \ striving 
or . activity , in what is left after the world is bl9tted out�- ' Lord , 
give us weak eyes . for the , things of : the world ' --namely in God ' s  
true real+ty � the power which constit�tes . the Self , which pervades 
it and creates it and of . which the self is a part . "l07 
The key to self�act�ali�ation is - subj ectivity , but subj ectivity 
in . the Kierkegaardian sense , not - as it . is understood in European 
philosophy - before Kierkegaard . Kierkegaard called that type "the 
untruth of subj ec�ivity � ul08 The · untruth of subj ectivity disappears 
if man 1 is able · to stanl;l before God as . an · individual ;  "as a person � 
face de Dieu, as den Enkelte . "109 For such a . person � subj ectivity 
becomes the saving agent , for , thei). _ God , "the , power which constitutes 
107Hartmath "The Self in ·, Kierkegaard ; "  p .  9 . Italics mine . 
l08valt'r Lindst:rom� "The · Problem of Obj ectivity and 
Subj ectivity in Kierkegaard , "  in A Kierkegaard Critique, . eds . 
Howard A.  Johnson . and Niels Thulstrup , (Harper and Brotqers , 
Pub1ish�rs �  New Y�rk, 1962) , p .  230 . 
109Ibld . , p .  234 . 
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the Self , which pervades · it ,and creates it and ef whi�h the self is 
a part , "llO is the absolutely compelling subj ective principle . The · 
infinite self in all ef its inwardness chooses itself . 
When I choose absolutely , ! . choose the absolute , for 
! , am the absolut� . But in complete identity with this 
r .can . say that · !  cl)oose the , absolute . which chooses -me , 
that ! - posit the absolute -,which posits me ; for if I do 
not remember that this secQnd expression is equally 
absolute ,  my category ef cheice is false , for the 
category is precisely th� identity ef both propositions . lll 
A famous passage in Kierkegaard describes this action of the 
finite self choosing the infinite self : 
So when all · has became still around-. one , as . solemn as 
a star l:f.t night p when the soul . is : alone in the whole 
world , then there appears before one , not· a distinguished 
man � · but the . eternal Fewer itself . . The h�avens part ; as 
it were,  and the I chooses itself��or rather, receives 
itself . Then has the soul beheld t�e loftiest sight that 
mortal eye can see and whi�h never can .be - forgotten , then 
the personality receives the accol$de of knighthood which 
ennobles . it fer an e�ern�ty • .  He does net become another 
man t an h� was befere but . he .becemes himself conciousriess 
is unified, and he · is . himself . 
From the foregoing discqssien we must conclude that Hartman ' s  
nation ef self-actualizat ion cannot be under�tood apart from faith. 
It · is impossible th�t .. the person could - reacn the , fulf illment of him-
self apart · frqm his reaching Gad by faith . The person who has thus 
expanded his sp�rit . te inf ini�y , lives the f inite as part of the 
infinite , fusing the two inte one : "tl)e impassible � the absurd--and 
llOH�rtman , "The · Self in Kierkegaard , " : p .  9 .  
lllLindstr�m. p .  231 . 
112KierkegaarQ. � Either/Or ,  Vol . . II ; p .  181 . Italics 
mine . 
at · th� same ti�e the obvious and most natural--fusion that Jesus 
demands of ue . nll3 
If this is -what self ac�ualization means , does not - Hart�n 
base th:is fourth _ proof upon the , wrong foundat�en? ,  Rather than an 
denumer�ble infinity of moments in sel�-realization , a richer form 
of infinity could · be · found i� the infinite relationships which 
result � in the uniting of th� finite with t�e inf inite ground of our 
existen�e . To argue th�t th� human person - is infinite because he 
is potentially , or l!i)gically , capable ·. of a denumerable series of 
moments in self-realizati(:)n , is �o sacrifice the human , person on - the 
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altar . of the tbeqry of types . A . case .might be made · again�;�t - Professor 
H�rtman th�t he ,has given ,_a proof · for the . infinity of .moments ,  not of 
the person . who experienc�s · th�se moments .  
I� its present form, Hartman ' s  fourth proof . and t�e others -
which place emphasis on - quantitative , rather than qualitative infinity , 
would · give credence to Mueller ' s  criticis� of Hartman ' s  value _ calculus 
in that 
• almost anything under . one aspect or another is � 
inf in�te . A straight : line conceptually at - least reaches 
no point at whi�h it could net , be extended : T�erefore . 
to call something 11inf ini te '� demands some qual if icat.i<m . 114 
In summary ; I can follow Professor Hartman in concluding that the 
hum�n person; is a self-actualizing being , but . ! have difficulty in 
accepting his theeis t�at t�e human · person achieves - "infinity" through 
113Har�ma'{l , "The Self in Kierkegaard , "  p .  20 �  
114Muel1er � p .  25 . 
an �nf�nite series of moments of · self-re�lbation . It ·wo\,lld seem 
that i�tri"Qsic ._valuatio"Q should measure · the individual ' s  uniqueness , 
not the · infinite number of - his acts of self-realization . 
"Uniqueness" should . be made · separable from "non-denumerable 
in,finity. " Hart111an 1 has not ·ye�  clearly _ demonstrated .- that the 
human 1 person is - a non-den�merable · inf inity , nor is it :necessary to 
prove < this in order to demonstrate , his uniqueness . ·  Most l philosf 
ophers agree tha� the .human per�on iii! unique . He · differs not . only 
in , degree * but · in kind , frem other creatures . But uniqueness  dees 
not ne�essitate nen-den�erable· infinity . I think Professor Hart; 
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man: att811lpts to say - much , more , about human persons than he can suppert .  · 
Inqeed , if his definit:f,.en _ of · non-denumerable , infinity is applied , 
then he applies to man everyth�ng that can ·be , said - abeut God . 
CHAPTER II I . 
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
Each i of Hartman ' s  four axiological prqofs . of - the individual 
human\ person · as having . the mini�um card:J.nality A1 (� 1) . "He is a 
cont inuum of concepts . (a) , of self - reflections (b) , of existences 
(c) , and of moments (d) , he is a spiritual -. Gestalt . "llS . . 
However , it . is question<_lble whether these .. proofs support the . 
infinity .. of . the human person. :who partic;.ipates in these activities , I 
or wheth�r we - have here . a  logical proof of the potential infinity 
of a de�umerable ser:!,es of concepte , reflections , existences , and 
moments • .  For example , in the - epistemological proof (and . ! believe 
the criticism may be applicable in some degree to similar features · 
of -the other proofs) , ·his argument seems to move , inconclusively from 
the ability of . the person to think a denumerably inf inite series of 
thoughes about t�e total n�ber. of things in the world (cardinality 
�0) , an4 his . ability t� reflect on his thoughts , and to reflect on 
his reflections · ad . infinitum (cardinality \'\( 1) ,  to th� statement 
that . since tbese " thoughts . are infinite in number , therefore man·. is 
inf inite . 
Hartman - has said in several of his articles and in classes 
that the infinity of · the person rests in : the last resort on its self-
reflexivit,y , that is , the definition of the ·. person as that being 
115Ha.�tman , "Four , Axiological Proofs , " :  p .  436 . 
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which has its own definition of itself within itself . "From this 
fol�ows . everything . The predicates , therefore , by which the quality 
of the person is measured are : at the same time properties within 
the person · - as is nat - the case with a nan ... reflective : .thing . 116 
Perhaps Professor Har�man·, woulc! have had · stranger . arguments 
had he · follawed Pascal , whom he mentions , ll7 in 
.
basing the value of 
· the ._ human person , nat upon his ability to think . a  infinite number 
af thought� , · but upon the . unique · ability of the "thinking reed" to 
think at all . 
Perhaps it is not necessary - to attempt to prove , the infinity 
af the � human person , since inf�nity can , have : many . meanings . and does 
n�t - necessarily involve .uniqueness . Mueller may- be right · when he 
says that .Hartman ' s  system could at�ribute a kind - of in�inity to _ 
anything at . all . ll8 To demonstrate · the uniqueness of the human 
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person would - be to show that he differs in kind rather than in degree 
from other things ! ll9 
The four definitions cauld still . serve as the basis for arguing 
for , the uniqueness af the indivi4ual · person , but .. wauld nqt ·· necessitate 
having ta posit -his infinity. Though · I have no quarrel with - Hartman ' s  
116H�rtman , letter ta Pruitt . 
117Hartman , "Faur · Axialagical Praafs , "  p .  433 . 
lliL rtueller , p .  25 . 
119The questian of  man ' s � uniqueness is - diacusse4 . by . Mortimer 
J .  Adl�r in ·,The Diffefence af �n.-, an! the ;Differeuce It Makes , The · 
World Publil;!hing CompanY� Cleveland ; Ohio , 1968 : 
· 
descriptic;>n of · the human ., person -as being "essentially infinit�--a 
spiritual Gestalt whose , cardinality ie� that of the cont in1.1-um, "120 
I do not believe that infinity , as used . in the Hartman1 system,  
treats the human person with t�e singul�r uni�ueness ,which Hartman , 
really wa�ts tQ establish . 
Uniqueness of the human person is a _ promtnent: feature of the 
Hartmanian value system, and it , is implicit in the four proofs ;  
however , · it , is · infinity which nartman · stresses . ! . think he means . 
to infer that tbe infinity of the human, person makes him unique , 
but this point is n�t -very well establishe4 . If he · had argued for 
the uniquen�ss of the ·,human person in that he thinks , reflects upon . 
himself , appropriat�s to himself t�e intensional propert ies of 
created things , and determines his own self-actualizat ion . he may 
have · made · a stronger case for placing the human person at the . top 
of the . hierarchical · scale of values . ·  
The concluding sections of "The · Four Axiological Proofs '·' 
attempt to show the individual human - person : as · being of greater . 
valu� tha� a collection of persons in a soc iety , and again , I 
believe an emphasis on uniqueness rathe� tha� infinity could , and 
shQuld , have been stressed . · 
Wh�t · is . the cardinality of the total person? Hartman says 
th�s -depends on "the state . of in�er integration of - harmonization of 
of the person . "l.21 According to the · four . definitions , he .can never 
120aa�tman , "Four Axi�logical Proofs , " ; P •  433 
12lrbid . , · p .  436 . 
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be of a lower cardinality than A1 ( \IS 1) , but he may rise to cardinal- · 
Let us def ine the inner harmonization of a ,, set of n · .  
items as th� act�ali�ation of - all · tqe subsets possible 
of this set . This total;t.ty is � - A1 . A person , . then , ·. 
which . actualizes the t9tal�ty of subsets . of any � - of .  
its . four , definitional 1 sets , rises to . the cardinality A2 , 
for 2Al = A2 • This cardinality does not change ,  even , 
though the person may , in the sense defined , actualize 
each of'· its four definitional sets , even an · infinite 
number , A0 , or a continuum, A1 , of them. l22 
The result of this equatton i� that the maximum cardinality 
of a human person : A2 ( � z) which denotes the actualization of all 
infini�e possibilities of one , or several , of its def initional 
infiniti�s . Possible cardinalities for the human -. person ranges 
from a minimum cardinality A1 , to a maximum , cardinality A2 . - A 
minimum ca+din,lity A1 means - that the human; person · fulfills the 
definitional capacities as · a · human being , even though t�ese may nQt 
be actualized . A ·ma;ximum car4inality A2 _ means that h� has actualized 
all of the infinite possibilities of at l�ast : one of the def initional·. 
infinities of the human , being . l23 
When speaking of t4e maximum carc;linality A2 � ( � z) , does 
Professor : Hart�n refer to th� individual person in a state of immor-
t�ity? - He has sai4 himself , that · no concrete individual - person can 
act\lally ful(ill all of the - dimensions of ·_any one •  of ,the def ini­
tions � l24 If he - does ,mean -, to infer something like immortality , 
122tbid . 
123rbid • 
- ·· 
l24HartlJI.an, "The · Logie of Value , "  p .  410 . 
it . still would not be necessary , to argue for - the infinity of man . 
Christian theology , has tr.aditionally .taught . immortality of the self , 
but th� imm9rtal person is still f inite .  Christianity has held 
that infinity _ belongs to. God alone . 
To return to - the point : of Professor Hartman ' s . argument · that 
the value of human society can never surpass the - value of one · 
. . 
individual·, person ; h� goes on to say , 
Conyersely , eacht individual hu�n being has axiologically . 
the value of all human - society , meaning the . cosmic . society . 
of mankind ; let alone that of ter�estrial society , not to . 
spe�k . of ·  that · of any particular - . local , "national , "  or other -
terrestrial society . l25 
· 
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S!nce the person is  unique in that he is  of  greater valu� than 
any . society of men-, Hartman· argues · that · to impose · the will of any 
society on a ,  human bei�g is : agai�st t�e innermost nature of man in 
that such - an action is a transposition - of values , which requires the 
higher value _to serve tqe lesser . Only in morally primitive societies 
where human persons have not · yet recognized their uniqueness . and 
infinity is it possible to impose the society upon the individual 
person ._ 
Where individuals within a closed society (Bergson ' s  terminal- · 
ogy for - morally primitiye - societies) recognize their infinity , there . 
will : inevitably be :, an explosion from within , as Boris Pasternak · 
depicted in , his famous novel . "l)r . Zhivago is he who truly l ives , 
and · an empire f�arec;l the · impact · of , his human:J_ty . ·�126 
125Ibid . , pp . 437-438 . 
126� • • p . · 438 . 
A political system based on other than human values are · in · 
Pasternak' s words , "based on a false premise • • •  pathetically 
amateurish . "l27 But a , politica� system which is based on human 
values ceases to be · a  system - it . is li�e itself . l28 
There can be little , obj ection to Pr�fessor ; Hartman ' s  
conclusion that the human person is at the top of the scale of 
values . He has made a strong . case . for the uniqueness . of the indi­
viduaL person , but . the argument for his infinity has yet to be 
adequately supported o 
127 rbid . 
128rkid . 
·--
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